IMAGE  EVALUATION 
TEST  TARGET  (MT-S) 


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CIHM/ICMH 

Microfiche 

Series. 


CIHM/ICMH 
Collection  de 
microfiches. 


Canadian  Institute  for  Historical  Microreproductions  /  Institut  Canadian  de  microreproductions  historiques 


Technical  and  Bibliographic  Notes/Notes  techniques  et  bibliographiques 


The  Institute  has  attempted  to  obtain  the  best 
original  copy  available  for  filming.  Features  of  this 
copy  which  may  be  bibliographicaliy  unique, 
which  may  alter  any  of  the  images  in  the 
reproduction,  or  which  may  significantly  change 
the  usual  method  of  filming,  are  checked  below. 


D 


D 


D 
D 


D 


D 


D 


Coloured  covers/ 
Couverture  de  couleur 


I      I    Covers  damaged/ 


Couverture  endommagde 


Covers  restored  and/or  laminated/ 
Couverture  restaurie  et/ou  pellicul6e 


□    Cover  title  missing/ 
Lc 


.e  titre  de  couverture  manque 


Coloured  maps/ 

Cartes  gdographiques  en  couleur 


Coloured  ink  (i.e.  other  than  blue  or  black)/ 
Encre  de  couleur  (i.e.  autre  que  bleue  ou  noire) 


I      I    Coloured  plates  and/or  illustrations/ 


Planches  et/ou  illustrations  en  couleur 

Bound  with  other  material/ 
Reli4  avec  d'autres  documents 

Tight  binding  may  cause  shadows  or  distortion 
along  interior  margin/ 

Lareiiure  serr6e  peut  causer  de  I'ombre  ou  de  la 
distortion  le  long  de  la  marge  intirieure 

Blank  leaves  added  during  restoration  may 
appear  within  the  text.  Whenever  possible,  thesi 
have  been  omitted  from  filming/ 
II  se  peut  que  certaines  pages  blanches  ajouties 
lors  d'une  restauration  apparaissent  dans  le  texte, 
mais,  lorsque  cela  dtait  possible,  ces  pages  n'ont 
pas  6t6  filmies. 

Additional  comments:/ 
Commentaires  supplimentaires; 


L'Institut  a  microfilm6  le  meilleur  exemplaire 
qu'il  lui  a  6t6  possible  de  se  procurer.  Les  details 
de  cet  exemplaire  qui  sont  peut-Atre  uniques  du 
point  de  vue  bibliographique,  qui  peuvent  modifier 
une  image  reproduite,  ou  qui  peuvent  exiger  une 
modification  dans  la  m6thode  normale  de  filmage 
sont  indiquis  ci-dessous. 

□    Coloured  pages/ 
Pages  de  couleur 

0    Pages  damaged/ 
Pages  endommagdes 

Q    Pages  restored  and/or  laminated/ 
Pages  restaurdes  et/ou  pellicul^es 

0    Pages  discoloured,  stained  or  foxed/ 
Pages  d6color6es,  tacheties  ou  piqudes 

I      I    Pages  detached/ 


D 


Pages  ddtachdes 

Showthrough/ 
Transparence 

Quality  of  prir 

Quality  in6gale  de  I'impression 

Inclur'^es  supplementary  materii 
Comt)rend  du  materiel  supplimentaire 

Only  edition  available/ 
Seule  Edition  disponible 


r~7  Showthrough/ 

I      I  Quality  of  print  varies/ 

r~~|  Inclur'^es  supplementary  material/ 

|~~|  Only  edition  available/ 


Pages  wholly  or  partially  obscured  by  errata 
slips,  tissues,  etc.,  have  been  refilmed  to 
ensure  the  best  possible  image/ 
Les  pages  totalement  ou  partiellement 
obscurcies  par  un  feuillet  d'errata,  une  pelure, 
etc.,  ont  4t^  filmies  d  nouveau  de  faqon  A 
obtenir  la  meilleure  image  possible. 


The  CO 
to  the 


The  im 
posslbl 
of  the 
filming 


Origini 
baginn 
the  las 
sion,  o 
other 
first  pi 
sion,  a 
or  illua 


The  lai 
shaSi  c 
TINUE 
which! 

Maps, 

diffare 

entire!^ 

baginn 

right  a 

requirt 

matho( 


This  item  is  filmed  at  the  reduction  ratio  checked  below/ 

Ce  document  est  film6  au  taux  de  reduction  indiquA  ci-dessous. 


10X 

14X 

18X 

22X 

26X 

30X 

y 

12X 


16X 


20X 


24X 


28X 


32X 


aire 

1  details 
lues  du 
t  modifier 
iger  une 
)  filmage 


The  copy  filmed  here  has  been  reproduced  thanks 
to  the  generosity  of: 

Library  of  the  Public 
Archives  of  Canada 


The  images  appearing  here  are  the  best  quality 
possible  considering  the  condition  and  legibility 
of  the  original  copy  and  in  keeping  with  the 
filming  contract  specificatisns. 


L'exemplaire  f  ilmt  f  ut  reproduit  grdce  A  la 
gtnirositA  de: 

La  bibliothdque  des  Archives 
publiques  du  Canada 

Les  images  suivantes  ont  6t6  reproduites  avec  le 
plus  grand  soin.  compte  tenu  de  la  condition  et 
de  la  netteti  de  l'exemplaire  filmi,  et  en 
conformity  avec  les  conditions  du  contrat  de 
filmage. 


/ 
jdes 


Original  copies  in  printed  paper  covers  are  filmed 
beginning  with  the  front  cover  and  ending  on 
the  last  page  with  a  printed  or  illustrated  impres- 
sion, or  the  back  cover  when  appropriate.  All 
other  original  copies  are  filmed  beginning  on  the 
first  page  with  a  printed  or  illustrated  impres- 
sion, and  ending  on  the  last  page  with  a  printed 
or  illustrated  impression. 


Les  exemplaires  originaux  dont  la  couverture  en 
papier  est  imprimie  sont  film6s  en  commen9ant 
par  le  premier  plat  et  en  terminant  soit  par  la 
derniire  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration,  soit  par  le  second 
plat,  selon  le  cas.  Tous  les  autres  exemplaires 
originaux  sont  film6s  en  commenpant  par  la 
premiere  page  qui  comporte  une  emp'einte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration  et  en  terminant  par 
la  dernlAre  page  qui  comporte  une  telle 
empreinte. 


The  last  recorded  frame  on  each  microfiche 
shaSI  contain  the  symbol  ^^>  (meaning  "CON- 
TINUED"), or  the  symbol  V  (meaning  "END"), 
whichever  applies. 


Un  des  symboles  suivants  apparaftra  sur  la 
dernidre  image  de  cheque  microfiche,  selon  le 
cas:  le  symbols  —^  signifie  "A  SUIVRE '.  le 
symbols  V  signifie  "FIN". 


ire 


Maps,  plates,  charts,  etc.,  may  be  filmed  at 
different  reduction  ratios.  Those  too  large  to  be 
entirely  included  in  one  exposure  are  filmed 
beginning  in  the  upper  left  hand  corner,  left  to 
right  and  top  to  bottom,  as  many  frames  as 
required.  The  following  diagrams  illustrate  the 
method: 


Les  cartes,  planches,  tableaux,  etc.,  peuvent  dtre 
filmte  A  des  taux  de  reduction  diff6rents. 
Lorsque  le  document  est  trop  grand  pour  dtre 
reproduit  en  un  seul  cliche.  11  est  film6  d  partir 
de  Tangle  supArieur  gauche,  de  gauche  d  droite. 
et  de  haut  en  bas,  en  prenant  le  nombre 
d'images  n6cessaire.  Les  diagrammes  suivants 
illustrent  la  mithode. 


ly  errata 
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1 

2 

3 

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PEACE 


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PEACE    WITHOUT    DISHONOUR—WA 
WITHOUT  HOPE. 


.:.>■ 


BEIMO 


A  CALM  AND  DISPASSIONATE 


ENQUIRY 


INTO   TRK 


QUESTION  OF  THE  CHESAPEAKE, 


*N0   THB 


'  I      « 


i 


NECESSITY  AND  EXPEDIENCY 


M 


09 


WAR. 


BY  A  YANKEE  FARMER. 


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PRINTED  BY  GREENOUGH  AND  STEBBINS. 
1807. 


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The  A 


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// 


TO  THE  PUBLICK. 


IT  cannot  be  expected,  that  u  farmer  should 
display  the  ornaments  of  a  polished  stijle — The  au- 
thor has  aimed  only  at  perspicuitij,  impartialitij^  and 
truth.  A  boldness  and  freedom  churacteristick  of 
the  real, ancient  Neiv-Englund  farmers,  zvill  be  found 
strong  I  If  marked  in  ever  if  part  of  this  little  essaif. 
The  publick  good  is  the  author^s  onlif  object — true 
patriotism  his  onlif  stimulus — and  the  promotion  of 
justice,  and  vindication  of  our  national  good  faith,  his 
only  aim. 

In  these  times  of  party  spirit  he  cannot  hope 
to  escape  censure.  His  love  of  truth — his  displaij 
of  our  own  errors — his  disjwsidon  to  render  Justice 
to  other  stations  icill  probablij  be  attributed  to  the 
basest  motives — For  such  is  too  often  the  fashion  of 
the  day — to  abuse  those  ivhom  ice  cannot  ansiver. 

It  xcould  not  surfjrise  him,  if  he  should  even 
be  called  an  Old  Tory  or  a  British  hireling ;  for  he 
has  often  remarked  that  this  is  a  sf>ecies  of  argument 
which  never  fails  of  success^  when  all  other  reasoning 
or  abuse  is  found  ineffectual.  But  he  shall  despise 
the  calumnies,  and  smile  at  the  attacks  of  all  the 
partizans  of  war,  afeic  of  xohom,  broken  in  fortune 
or  reputation,  can  only  hope  to  rebuild  both  on  the 
ruins  of  their  Country. 


Si 


I'll 


.>»**SW«*i'.'> 


t 


// 


4 


TO  THE  FARMll'^S,  MERCHANTS,  AND 
MECHANICKS  OF  NEW-ENGLAND. 


/f 


FELLOW    CITiiZENS, 

IF  at  any  time  a  citizen  is  juftified  in  making  an  ap- 
peal to  your  undcrllanding,  to  your  fober  rcafon — If  a  cool  and 
difpafllonate  difplay  of  your  danger,  and  your  true  intcrefts  be  at 
any  period  a  duty,  it  furely  becomes  fuch,  when  you  are  threatened 
with  a  calamity  by  which  your  rights,  Thertics,  property,  and  lives 
are  to  bo  expofcd  to  the  moil  imminent  danger.  *We  arc  told  by 
the  publick  ncwfpapers  which  have  ufually  been  the  vehicles  of  the 
language  of  oui  adminillration — wc  are  alfo  informed,  that  many 
very  influential  men  in  and  out  oT  the  adminillration,  concur  with 
the  publick  papers  in  declaring,  "  that  War  will  probably  take 
place,  and  that  it  is  inevitahky  unlefs  the  government  of  Great- 
Britain  fhould  make  ample  reparation  for  the  attack  on  our  frigate 
the  Chcfapeake."  Wc  alfo  know,  that  all  defcriptions  of  people  in 
Great-Britain,  however  oppofed  in  political  opinions,  concurred  in 
one  fentiment,  that  Great-Britain  never  could,  and  never  ought  to 
yield  the  principle  for  which  they  believed  that  we  contend,  the 
right  of  enhlling  and  harbourir.g  the  deft rtcrs  from  their  publick 
(hips  of  war  It  is  rendered  almoil  certain,  therefore,  that  Great- 
Britain,  "  %vhile  flie  will  explicitly  difavow  the  claim  tofearch  our  na- 
r'tonal  Jhips  of  ivar,  will  nevertheli  fs  contend,  that  we  have  no  right 
to  enViiv  her  deferters,  and  protett  them  under  our  publick  flag, 
b\.  that  if  we  do  fo  conduft,  and  refufe  to  deUver  them  on  demand, 
fne  will  retake  them  by  force,  on  a  common  jurifdiAion,  the  High 

*  See  the  lanjiju.ijje  of  tlic  National  liitflligrnccr,  and  i.f  the  Aurora,  who 
I'onfider  war  as  inevitable,  unlefs  Grcat-ilrit^iii  grants  reparation  for  the  at- 
tack on  the  Chefapeake.  Mr.  Gallatin,  Mr.  Dearborn,  and  other  publiek  ofli- 
rers  are  alledgeU  to  have  declared  that  war  is  to  be  expected. 


(I 


I 


V 


v., 


I. 


(i(.?j-."  It"  I'uch  Ihould  be  Irt  final  docillon,  as  we  have  real'on  to 
fear,  fhc  cannot  punifli  Admiral  Bcikeli>y  without  manifcll  injullicc 
to  him. 

ff,  thfictoro,  our  adminillration  arc  finccrc  in  their  determina- 
tion to  go  to  war,  unlefs  reparation  be  made  for  the  attack,  on  the 
Chefapeuke,  war  fe»ms,  as  they  privately  afl'ert,  to  be  inevitable, 
unlefs  the  prudent  and  temperate  deliberations  of  Congrefs,  or  the 
feafouable  expreffion  of  publiek  opinion,  fliall  check  this  dedruc- 
tive,  and  1  may  add,  r.ijh  }M)licy.  War,  at  all  times  a  publkk  ca- 
lamity, becomes  pecidiarly  alarming  and  ileilruAive  to  a  nation, 
whicli  has  been  for  twenty-four  years  exclufively  devoted  to  the 
arts  of  peace — which  has  ncglefted  every  mean  of  national  de- 
fence— which  has  devoted  none  of  its  revenues  to  a  wife  prep- 
aration for  war,  to  which  all  nations  are  occafionally  expofed. 
It  is  peculiarly  alarming  to  a  nation,  governed  by  an  adminillra- 
tion not  only  delHtute  of  military  talents,  but  who  have  always 
avowed  their  oppofition  to  every  thing  like  military  preparation, 
and  who,  whih-  they  have  profcfFed  to  rely  upon  the  moft  frail  of 
all  fupports,  the  juftice  of  nations,  and  have  therefore  neglefted 
every  mean  of  preparation  or  defence,  have  moll  unfortunately 
brought  us  to  the  verge  of  a  moft  awful  precipice,  where  we  have 
no  alternative  but  either  to  plunge  headlong  to  a  certain  and  de- 
ilru(5t.ive  fate,  or  to  retrace  our  Heps,  as  they  fay,  with  ignominy 
and  difgrace.  If  at  a  moment  fo  eventful,  and  in  a  pofition  fo  tre- 
mendous, any  friendly  hand  fliould  point  out  to  us  a  path  by  which 
we  might  favc  both  our  live?  and  our  honour,  one  would  naturally 
imagine,  that  it  ought  to  excite  our  gratitude,  rather  than  our  ha- 
tred— to  merit  our  thanks,  rather  than  puniflimcnt  ;  but  other 
doctrines  feem  to  prevail.  The  friends  of  tlie  adminiftration, 
wounded  at  the  true  picture  of  our  fituation,  provoked  that  any 
man  fhould  imanfwerably  prove  fume  errors  in  our  own  condudl 
wliich  diminifh  the  juftice,  and  of  courfe,  the  neceffity  of  a  war, 
have  advanced  an  idea  novel  in  the  hiftory  of  free  nations,  that  *"  it 
is  treafon  to  queftion  the  juftice  or  expediency  of  a  war,"   even  bc- 

'  I-xtrat't  from  the  Natiiuial  Fiitellijjciircr  in  anfwor  to  Pacificus,  a  writer  in 
}!  t  Bofton  Ccntini'l,  ajrainfl  the  neccll'ity  of  War.  'JMiis  may  l)e  found  in  ih' 
I'.'liiuliuiii,  of  September  '.">,  in  a  piece  entitled  "  Modern  Liberty." 


lorc  the  only  conftituted  authority  authorized  to   dtciile  thin  qucs  • 
tion,  tlie  l.egiflaturc,  liad  convened  to  deliberate  upon  it. 

The  example  of  Great-Britain,  whole  tyrannical  principles  have 
fo  long  been  the  theme  of  popular  harangue,  one  would  think  would 
be  conclufive  on  this  point — and  that  whatever  may  be  done  luith 
impunity  in  that  monarchical  and  fevcre  government,  might  certainly 
be  permitted  in  our  free  and  enlightened  country.  It  is  well  known 
that  all  the  publick  writers  in  England,  both  before  and  after  the  de- 
r'lfion  of  Parliament,  as  to  the  quellion  of  war,  undertake  to  arraign 
its  juftice,  its  pohcy,  its  neceflity,  its  expedience,  their  own  wcaknel!;, 
tlij  means  which  they  have  of  annoying  the  enemy,  and  to  magnify 
the  refources,  power,  and  talents  of  tlieir  foes  :  nor  can  there  bo 
found,  in  a  fingle  inftancc,  an  attempt  to  check  this  freedom  of  en- 
quiry, cither  by  profecution  or  threats. 

If  this  example,  and  the  explicit  language  of  our  own  Conftitu- 
tions  were  not  fufficient  authority,  we  might  cite  an  illullrious  man, 
whofe  opinions  a  large  part  of  the  community  would  be  unwil- 
ling to  queilion. — Prefident  Jefferfon  la_,  s  it  down  as  an  eilablifhod 
axiom,  "  that  the  utmoft  liberty  of  the  prcl'a  may  be  fafcly  indulg- 
ed, in  fuch  a  country  as  ours,  and  that  errors  in  opinions  can  do  no 
injury,  'where  reafon  is  left  free  to  combat  them" 

If  this  doftrine  be  true  in  ordinary  cafes,  liow  much  more  ftrong 
its  application  to  the  important  queflions  of  war  and  peace  ? — To 
what  terrible  c  'ifequenccs  would  the  tyrannical  do6\rine  of  the 
National  Intelligencer,  above  quoted,  lead  us  ?  A  foreign  nation 
makes  an  attack  which  is  alledged  to  be  caufe  of  war  :  Such  an 
attack  mud  always  involve  a  queftion  of  faft,  and  a  queftion  of  law 
or  right.  If  the  opinion  of  any  particular  fet  of  men,  even  of  dig- 
nified officers,  could  be  conclti/ive  as  to  thefe  two  queflions  :  If  no  pri- 
vate citizen  who  might  be  in  pofleflion  of  hotter  evidence  as  to  the 
fadsi  or  better  authority  as  to  the  law,  could  divulge  thefe  fafts, 
and  make  known  his  principles  of  law,  it  would  follow  that  our 
Conftitution  would  be  a  dead  letter  ; — the  Legiflature  would  be- 
come mere  tools  in  the  hands  of  the  executive,  and  the  nation  might 
be  involved  in  all  the  calamities  of  war  at  the  pleafurc  of  a  fingle 
man.  But  the  doftrine  of  the  Government  paper  goes  farther,  you 
can  not  only  not  difcufstlie  queftion  of  right,  b'.it  you  muft  be  filcnt 


f 


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• 


M  to  the  refoiirct' 8  or  ability  of  tin-  nation  to  gain  the  objcft  of  the 
war.  The  opinion  of  the  Executive  is  coiiehifive  on  this  point  alfo. 
The  National  IntelUgenccr  tells  the  people  of  tlie  United  States, 
that  Great-Britain  has  done  an  unprovoktil  a6\,  which  juilifies  a  de- 
claration of  war  on  our  part ; — this  point,  it  fays,  it  is  treafnn  in  any 
body  to  difprove. — It  adds,  that  this  war  would  be  expedient,  be- 
caufc  *•  we  can  bring  Great-Britain  to  our  feet.  We  can  ruin  her 
manufafturers  ;  \vc  can  ftarve  her  colonics  ;  we  can  take  Canada 
and  Nova-Scotia  :  while  the  injury  will  be  trifling  to  ourfelves,  as 
we  can  fupply  ourfelves  as  plentifully  with  foreign  goods  by  prices 
we  fliall  take,  as  we  are  no<w  fupplied  by  commerce  ;  and  our  pro- 
duce will  meet  as  ready  a  fale  in  war  as  in  peace." 

But  any  attempt  to  difprove  thefc  propofitions,  cfpccially  if  made 
with  truth  and  ability,  it  declares  to  be  the  high  offence  oi  tnnfon, 
inafmuch  as  it  tends  to  prove  th?  opinions  o^  great  men  erroneous, 
and  to  difcourage  the  people  from  undertaking  a  war,  which  thofe 
great  men  have  rcfolvrd  to  wage. 

Braving  all  the  dangers  to  which  thofe  writers  are  expofed,  who 
venture  to  give  light  to  the  people,  on  this  moft  interefting  fubjedl, 
and  defpifing  the  threats  of  profecution  for  treafun,  I  (hall  attempt 
to  develope  the  principles,  to  trace  the  hiftory,  and  to  cxpofe  the 
fafts  in  relation  to  our  alledged  caufe  of  complaint  againll  Eng- 
land  ; — to  examine  our  own  conduft,  and  the  allegation  fo  often 
made,  that  the  attack  on  our  National  flag,  was  wholly  without 
provocation  ;  and  laftly,  to  confider  the  expediency  of  war,  in 
which  will  be  involved,  its  objeAs — the  profpeft  of  fuccefs  or  de- 
feat ;  our  refources,  and  means  of  annoyance  of  our  propofed  ene- 
my ;  and  the  power,  fituation,  and  interefts  of  the  nation  with 
whom  we  are  about  to  contend  ;  and  I  fliall  conclude  with  confid- 
ering  the  effeds  of  fuch  a  war,  whether  it  prove  fuccefsful  or  dif- 
graceful  upon  our  general  politicks,  interior  and  exterior,  and  upon 
thofe  great  and  permanent  interctts,  which  ought  never  to  be  over- 
looked when  we  are  weighing  minor  queflions,  or  debating  upon 
injuries  and  incidents  which  do  not  affcd,  or  compromife  our  wel- 
fare or  exigence. 

It  will  not  be  denied,  that  on  the  2kh  day  of  June  laft,  when 
the  attack  was  made  on  the  Chefapeake,  the  relations  between 


I 


:a-:T/  '.T  'p^'^wiimiw^i''w-^ 


n 


Gicat-Bntain  and  the  Unik-d  States,  were  thofc  o{  poaci,-  ami 
amity.— -This  is  proved  by  tlic  declarations  of  the  Prefidont  to 
Congrcfs,  ;.nd  the  conimiiiiicatioiis  of  our  Miiiillers  at  the  Court  of 
Creat-Bntain,  whicli  were  laid  before  that  honourable  body.*  h 
is  farther  proved  by  the  language  of  the  Britifli  Miiiillera  in  and  out 
of  Parliiunciit,  and  by  the  circumftance  of  our  Minillers  extraordi- 
nary having  Tigned  a  Treaty  of  Amity,  which  fettled  all  our  diflei- 
ences,  except  the  finglc  one,  of  the  right  of  fearch  of  merchant 
fhips  for  Britifli  feanien,  and  on  which  point,  it  is  faid  from  good 
authority,  Great-Britain  was  ready  and  offered  to  yield  the  right. 
of  frareh  except  as  it  refpeded  the  narrwiv  fms,  or  tliat  portion 
of  the  fea  which  immediately  furrounds  Great-Britain,  and  where 
the  danger  of  the  lofs  of  their  feamen,  who  are  their  only  defence, 
was  peculiarly  imminent. 

It  cannot  be  doubted,  therefore,  that  peace,  fo  much  to  be  de- 
fired  by  this  country,  would  not  have  been  interruj)teil,  and  thai 
our  profitaVde  neutrality  would  have  been  continued,  had  it  not 
l)efn  tor  the  afl'air  of  l)ie  Chefapcake,  which  cannot  he  too  much 
deplored.  The  queftion,  thcnforo,  is  limited  to  the  examination 
of  the  caufes  of  that  luifortunate  aCt,  and  of  the  confequences  which 
ought  to  refult  from  it. 

As  a  great  portion  of  the  iiritation  which  has  been  produced, 
excited,  and  encouraged,  has  proceeded  from  an  ignorance  of  the 
fafts  which  preceded  and  accompanied  that  affair,  it  will  be  ufeful, 
before  we  enter  into  an  invtftigation  of  the  Law  of  Nations  upon 
this  fubjeft,  to  fettle,  as  far  as  pofTible,  thefe_/(;(7j. 

In  the  fummer  of  1806,  a  French  fquadron  of  line  of  battle 
{flips  and  frigates  having  met  with  a  gale  upon  our  coafls,  a  part  of 
them  took  refuge  in  the  Chefapeake,  to  fhelter  themfelvcs  from  tlieir 
enemies.  This  rendered  it  neceffary  for  Grcat-Britain  to  detach  .1 
fquadron  to  watch  the  motion  of  their  enemies,  and  they  accord- 
ingly, as  they  lawfully  might,  took  their  Ration  in  Hampton 
Roads.  By  the  Law  of  Nations,  and  the  principles  of  an  impar- 
tial neutrality,  we  owed  to  both  thefe  fquadrons,  equal  protection. 
Wliile  we  permitted  tlie  French  to  repair  and  refit  their  fliips,  re- 

^  Sec  the  PrefiUtMit'*  Coinnuniications  to  Conj^rpfs,  on  tliu  fubjoiiV 


i    \ 


i 


y^^iioi4h(W>mh. 


iO 


i 


claiin  ihcir  dclcrtcis,  aiul  to  prepare  to  t'licounter  their  enemies,  the 
laws  of  hofpitaUty  equally  deinanded,  that  we  (hould  allow  equal 
privileges  and  indulgence  to  the  Britifli  fqiiadron,  and  more  efpc- 
cially  that  we  fhould  not  countenance  or  encourage  any  mcafurcs 
by  whicli  tlieir  means  of  encountering  their  enemy  fliould  be,  while 
they  were  under  our  protedtion,  weakened. 

*0n  the  7th  day  of  March  laft,  five  Brili/h  feamcn  belonging  to 
the  Britif'  (loop  of  war  Halifax,  Lord  James  Townfliend  command- 
er, while  employed  in  weighing  the  anchor,  rofe  upon  their  officer, 
threatened  to  vninkr  him,  and  made  off  with  the  boat  to  the  Amer- 
ican fhore,  where  they  landed.  Their  names  were,  Richard  Hu- 
bert, fail-maker,  born  in  Liverpool  ;  Henry  Saunders,  yeoman  of 
the  llieets,  born  in  Greenock  ;  Jenkin  Ratford,  born  in  London  ; 
George  North,  captain  of  the  main-top,  born  in  Kinfale  ;  and 
William  Hill,  born  in  Philadelphia  ;  who  entered  in  a  Britifli  port 
voluntarily,  viz.  in  Antigua. 

The  facl:s  of  their  birih  and  citizenfiiip  were  taken  from  the  (hip's 
books,  and  were  fworn  to  have  been  their  oivn  declaralioris  at  the 
time  of  t!ii.'ir  entry  on  board  the  (hip. 

The  nature  of  this  evidence  is  eonclufive,  and  its  fainirfs  hJlron<:^Iy 
marked  by  their  not  attempting  to  conceal  the  fad,  that  one  of  the 
five  was  born  in  Philadrlphia. 

The  very  day  afier  their  landing,  tliey  wore  enliiled  as  part  of 
the  crew  of  the  United  States  fliip  Chefapeake.  Perhaps  this  was 
done  ignorantly,  though  it  is  worthy  of  remark,  that  an  Eiiglilli- 
man,  and  ('fpecially  a  Scotchman  and  Irifliman,  may  be  almnjl  ns 
n<7(///y  difcenied  from  an  American,  by  thofe  who  are  converfanl 
witli  failors,  as  a  black  man  can  be  diilinguiihed  from  a  white  one. 
It  is  certain,  however,  that  thefe  men  could  not  have  been  p  Teffed 
of  Americaji  protections.  The  very  day  after  the  enliilment.  Lord 
.lames  Townfliend  demanded  thefe  men  of  Lieutenant  Sinclair,  the 
reciuiting  ofiieer  of  the  Chefapeake.  The  government  of  thf 
United  States  had,  as  Captain  Barron  aflerts,  ordered  the  recruiting 
ofiicers  not  to  tnl'tj]  Brit'ijh   dcfertcrs.     Thefe  deferters  were  not  at 


'  i'or  tlicfo  farts,  fic  the  afridavits  of  tl>c  rommandiT  am!  (ifliccrs  of  tl\r 
Mulifax,  priiui'd  in  the  I'rial  of  Jcnkia  Katford,  one  of  the  inutiiii'cri,  and  ri'- 
|irint(d  at  liollon. 


11 


ihh  time  on  board  the  fliip,  but  at  the  rendezvous.  It  naturally  oc- 
curs to  aflc,  why  did  not  Lieutenant  Sinclair,  in  obedicnco  to  tlu' 
orders  of  the  government,  immediately  difcharge  thefe  men  ?  If  he- 
had  enlifted  tliem  ignorantly,  the  fpirlt,  nay,  the  letter  of  his  orders, 
obliged  him  to  difcharge  them  as  foon  as  he  ki  from  the  higheft 
authority,  their  commanding  officer,  that  they  \\  ere  deferters  from  his 
fhip.  Many  honeft  well  meaning  men  have  contended,  that  the 
word  of  a  publick  oficer  ought  to  be  rcfpefted. 

This  is  an  excellent  general  principle,  and  the  obfervance  of  it 
would  tend  very  much  to  preferve  the  peace  of  nations  :  but  we 
fliould  not  forget  that  this  rule  has  a  double  application.  It  op- 
crates  as  much  in  favour  of  the  ofRcers  of  other  nations  as  of  our 
own.  When,  therefore.  Lord  James  Townfhcnd  pledged  his  word 
to  Lieutenant  Sinclair,  that  the  men  whom  he  had  enlillcd,  contrary 
to  the  orders  of  our  government,  were  his  failors,  and  that  the 
Britifli  government  had  a  pr.iperly  in  their  ferviccs,  it  was  as  much 
the  duty  of  Lieutenant  Sinclair  to  give  full  faith  to  the  word  of 
Captain  Tuwiifliend,  as  it  was  the  duty  of  Captain  Humphreys  to 
give  credit  to  the  declaration  of  Captain  Barron  : — it  was  Hill 
llrongcr  ; — Lieutenant  Sinclair  did  not,  could  not  know  that  the 
declaration  of  Lord  Townfliend  was  untrue  ;  but  Captain  Hum- 
phreys did  know  that  the  declaration  of  Commodore  Barron  was 
unfounded,  and  he  turned  out  to  be  right  in  the  fa6l. 

Lieutenant  Sinclair  made  an  evafive  anfwer  to  the  application  of 
Captain  Townfliend,  and  did  not  deliver  or  difcharge  the  men.  An 
application  was  then  made  to  Captain  Decatur,  wlio  referred  liim 
back  to  Sinclair.  The  Britilh  Conful  applied  to  the  Mayor  of 
Norfolk  for  thefe  men,  but  without  effedl — and  laftly,  the  Britifli 
Miniller  applied  to  our  government,  who  replied,  tiiat  they  had  on 
a  former  occafion  ftated  their  reafons  for  not  complying  with  tlicir 
lequefl,  and  liiat  moreover  the  men  were  Americans. 

Thefe  men,  who,  with  the  exception  of  Hill,  were  allwi/z/tif  B'-it- 
ijhfeamm,  and  had  no  claims  from  refidence  or  other  caufes  on  our 
protcdion,  were  all  continued  on  board  the  Chefapeake,  wliile  at 
Wafhington,  under  the  eye  of  our  government.  No  nieafurcs  ap- 
pear to  have  bei  ii  taken  to  afcertain  their  claims  to  our  proteftion. 
No  evidence  down  to  this  ddy  has  ever  been  publiflied  in  relation  t" 


^■l 


\ 


n 


.H«iv<V-ffll'*('!*r,1l» 


1/ 


<\ 


I 


iither  nf  theje  men.  Wo  muft  conclude,  therefore,  that  they  are,  as 
the  Britifli  have  proved  under  oath,  al/  native  Britifli  feamen,  except 
JV'ili'iam  Hill.  It  cannot  be  pretended  that  the  government  are  iu 
poffcfTion  of  evidence  in  n/pe^  to  them  which  it  does  nt)t  think  it  im- 
portant to  pubhfli,  becaufe  we  know  that  they  have  been  at  great 
pains  to  collect  and  pubhfli  the  evidence  with  refpeft  to  thre  other 
feavicn,  whofo  cafe  has  no  connedtion  with  the  caufe  of  the  attack 
on  the  Chcfapeake. 

TlicTr  feamen  weve  among  the  crew  of  the  Chefapeako  at  the  pe- 
riod of  tlic  fjid  four  fevcral,  folemn  demands,  and  continued  ou 
board  till  the  Ihip  failed  down  the  river,  when  four  of  I  hem  deferted. 
The  fifth,  Jenkin  Ratford,  remained  on  board  till  after  the  laft  de- 
mand made  by  Captain  Humphreys,  and  to  which  demand  Captain 
Barron  replied,  that  •'  he  hew  (^  no  fuch  men  as  Captain  Hum- 
phreys defcribed."  After  the  aftion,  Ratford  was  found  hid  in 
the  coal  Ik^Io  of  the  Chefapeakc,  and  has  fnice  l)een  tried,  found 
guilty  of  mutiny,  and  executed.  He  confeflcd  himfcb  to  be  a  na- 
tive of  London,  thai  he  had  entered  his  Britannick  Majefty's  fer- 
vice  voluntarily  ;  that  he  was  perfuaded  to  enter  on  board  the 
Chefapeakc,  in  onUr  to  protect  himfelf  from  the  fearch  of  his  offi- 
cers, and  that  on  his  entering,  he  was  aflccd  if  he  had  not  a  fecond 
name  ;  vhal  lie  thereupon  entered  by  the  name  of  Wilfon.  As  foon 
as  thefe  repeated  deniaisds  and  refufals  were  known  to  the  com- 
mander in  chief,  Admiral  Berkeley,  finding,  as  he  alledges,  that  the 
Ijamen  of  the  Biitifh  fleet  were  dcferting  every  day,  he  iflTued  the 
order  re  fir  red  vo  \\\  the  note  below,*  in  fublhmce  directing  the  offi- 
cers of  I;is  M;;j(.(ly's  fliips  under  his  command,  to  require  pcrmif- 
fion  of  t!u  Capia;.-.  -..f  i!ie  Chefapeakc  to  fearch  that  fliip,  on  the 
high  fcLts,  f  >r  tlif  deferters  referred  to  in  faid  order,  and  to  proceed 
and  fe-.ireh  l.ir  the  fame,  at  the  fame  time  offering  a  like  and  recip- 
ri-cal  peimitliiMi  to  tlio  Am, rican  officers.  Captain  Humphreys,  of 
'i!n-  Liop.nd,  was  entruiled  with  the  execution  of  this  order,  and 
•.!u;  manner  in  wiiu  h  he  executed  it,  is  too  well  known  to  need  rep- 
fliluMi.  'I'voii,-  ihrei'  ri'marka,  however,  may  not  be  amifs,  as  an 
-^pporUinily  .v;!!  not  again  oeevu-  in  the  courfe  of  the  propofed  dif- 


•  i^cc  Adnilr. !  \\<  i kilt  vV  iirdcr,  pt^nted  in  the  Trial  of  Jtnkin  Ratfortl 


13 


arc,  as 
1} except 
It  arc  ill 
Ik  it  ini- 
■at  great 
Irr  other 
le  attack 


ciifllon  : — 1ft,  That  another  formal  demand  was  made  oi  ihnr  own 
feamen,  by  the  Britifli  officers,  before  the  laft  alternati\e  was  re- 
forted  to  ;  that  this  demand  was  couched  in  terms  fo  polito  and 
refpedful,  that  it  would  not  have  been  beneath  the  dignity  ot  Cap- 
tain Barron  to  have  met  it  witli  equal  politcnefs,  and  to  have  ftated 
the  cafe  truly  to  Captain  Humphreys,  that  three  of  the  men  de- 
manded had  cfcaped,  and  that  the.  fourth  he  was  ready  to  deliver  ; 
this  would  probaoly  have  finifhed  this  unhappy  affair.  2d,  That 
nothing  in  the  anfwer  of  Captain  Barron,  is  a  fufficient  excufe  for 
his  not  delivering  up  Jenkin  Ratford,  one  of  the  mutineers,  then 
on  board  the  Chefapeake. 

The  rcafon  afligned  to  the  BritiHi  officer,  that  he  was  ordered 
not  to  fuffer  his  crew  to  be  muftered,  by  any  but  his  own  officers, 
docs  not  apply — There  was  no  neceffity  of  mujler'ing  them  at  all. 
At  that  time  it  was  well  known,  it  mujl  have  been  Lnoivn  on  board 
the  ChiTapeake,  who  the  men  demanded  were.  And  he  declares 
that  he  had  pofitive  orders  from  the  Government  not  to  enlift 
deferters,  which  amounted  to  an  order  to  ehliver  them,  if  he  had 
cnlilled  them  ignornntly. 

He  might  therefore  have  obeyed  hf/ih  thrfe  orders  af  the  Goveriu 
netit,  and  have  preferved  the  honour  of  our  flag  ;  and  what  is  more, 
the  honour,  faith,  and  reputation  of  our  officers.  By  fending  on 
board  the  Britiffi  fhip,  Jenkin  Ratford,  of  London,  a  mutineer,  and 
deferter,  and  accompanying  it  with  a  declaration  on  his  honour, 
that  the  others  had  di Ti-rtod  from  the  Chefapeake,  he  would  have 
fatisfied  Capt.  Humphrey.i,  would  have  fubltantially  obeyed  the 
order  of  our  Government  not  to  enlill  deferters,  and  have  prevent- 
ed the  unhappy  cataftropln.-. 

;{dly.  The  meannefc  of  many  of  our  publick  papers  and  refolii 
tions,  in  reprefenting  thi^  attack  as  cowardly,  and  affaffin-like,  can- 
not   be  too  mur'\  condemned  by  every  i  ,indid  and  ingenuous  mind. 

The  Li  opaid  was  a  50  gun  Ihip,  and  carried  a  fmallcr  number 
of  men  than  the  Chefapeake  ;  the  Chefapeake  was  a  large  4i, 
which  our  officers  have  often  declared  equal  to  a  Britifli  6i.  So 
far  from  the  Britifh  officers  knowing,  that  the  Chefapeake  was  un  • 
prepare;',  it  turns  out  by  the  charges  of  our  own  officers  againli 
Barron,  that  flic  was  J'ul/y  prepared.     Indeed  the  Britifli  officers 


i 


if'' 


14> 


iJ 


.•lie  laid  to  have  avowed  to  ours,  before  flic  lailed,  that  they  were 
inllruded  to  obtain  thefe  men  by  force  if  tliey  were  not  given 
up.  Our  own  «)lficcr  after  having  refolved  to  defend  his  fliip, 
ought  to  have  nailed  his  flag  to  the  mart,  and  to  have  funk  his 
adverfary,  or  to  have  gone  down  himfelf  with  his  flag  undiflion- 
oured.  It  is  the  difgracc  which  this  condudl  feems  to  fix 
upon  us,  which   makes  us  feel  fo  pungcntly. 

Had  Capt.  Barron  vindicated  our  national  honour  as  he  ought 
to  have  done,  we  fhould  have  feen  this  affair  in  a  very  different 
liglit.  We  fhould  have  acknowledged  that  we  were  wrong  in  the 
principle  of  enli/Iing  their  feamen,  but  we  might  have  added,  that  no 
nation  fhall  ihfult  our  flag  with  impunity  :  we  need  not  indeed 
liave  fa'id  this  ;  the  faft  would  fpcak  a  plainer  language. 

After  the  colours  of  the  United  States  fliip  had  been  ftruck^ 
the   Britifh  officers    proceeded  to   fearch    for   their  deferters. 

The  refult  of  this  fearch  was  tliis  : — they  found  Jcnkin  Rat- 
ford,  one  of  the  feamen  demanded — and  John  Strachan,  Daniel 
Martin,  and  William  AVare,  three  other  deferters,  whom  they  did 
not  fufpeft  liad  been  enliUcd  ;  who  were  not  contained  in  the  or- 
dcr  of  Admiral  Berkeley,  but  who  are  admitted  by  our  Govern' 
merit  to  have  been  deferters  from  tlie  Britifh  frigate  Melampus. 
Thefe  men  were  no  more  the  caufe  of  the  attack,  than  if  the 
Britifli  had  found  an  anchor  on  board,  which  had  been  JliJen  from 
their  fljip,  but  which  they  could  never  exfefl  to  find  on  board  one 
of  our  publiek  fliips.  They  alfo  found  twelve  other  Britifli  fea- 
men, who  not  being  deferters,  they  fuffered  to  remain.  It 
turned  out  therefore,  that  there  were  on  board  the  Chefapeake, 
when  flie  was  at  Wafliington,  five  Britifli  deferters  from  the  Hali- 
fax, three  deferters  from  the  Melampus,  and  twelve  other  Britifli 
li.anien. 

The  Britifli  officers  took  away  the  fing/e  feaman  whom  they 
found  of  thofe  demanded,  and  the  three  other  deferters  from  tlic 
Melampus,  whom  they  were  not  ordered  to  take,  becaule  they  were 
not  known  to  have  been  on  board. 

The  aftonifhment  and  indignation  of  every  American  was  excited 
foon  after,  by  the  Prelident's  declaration,  "  tliat  tht-  feamen  de- 
manded had  been  previoufly  afcertained  to  be  native  ctlizcns  of  the 


hood 
of  Ar 
to   do| 
turns 
formetl 
and   il 
Prefii] 
al  decl 
cer,  tl 
Til 
the 
had 


15 


United  States." — Tliat  the  Britifh  Admiral  fliould  have  the  hardi- 
hood to  dimand,  and  to  order  tlie  retaking  by  force,  native  citizens 
of  America,  vva;!  fo  incredible  in  itfelf,  that  fonie  writers  ventured 
to  doubt  it.  This  drew  out  the  evidence  on  both  fides,  and  it 
turns  out  tn()j}  umquivncally,  tliat  the  Prefidcnt  was  grofsly  »j///«- 
formed.  N.)  doubt  thefe  high  officers  mud  rely  upon  the  veracity 
and  accuracy  of  inferior  agents. — Unhappily  the  fource  of  the 
Prefident's  information  was  impure  ;  and  a  publick,  folemn,  nation- 
al declaration,  by  tlie  negligence  or  falfehood  of  fome  fubaltern  offi- 
cer, turns  out  to  be  unfupported  by  fails. 

The  cafe  was  this  ; — The  Proclamation  ftates,  that  the  aft  of 
the  Britifh  officers  was  fo  much  the  more  unpardonable,  "  as  it 
had  been  previoufly  afcertained  that  the  fcamen  demanded,  were 
native  citizens  of  the  United  States." 

The  iffemc  of  the  criminality  confifted  in  demanding  native  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States,  and  in  attacking  a  fliip  of  war  for  not 
delivering  fuch  citizens.  Now  it  turns  out  that  all  the  featncn  dc' 
nianded,  were  native  Britijl}  fcamen,  and  therefore,  all  this  csaggeV' 
at ed point  of  criminality  falls  to  tlic  ground. 

When  the  publick  called  upon  the  Government  for  the  evidence 
of  the  citizenfliip  of  thefe  deferters,  the  Prefident,  it  is  prefumcd» 
called  on  the  inferior  officers,  on  whose  report  he  had  made  the 
declaration  ;  and  they,  in  order  to  cover  their  errors,  inilead  of  fur- 
niihing  the  evidence  of  the  citi/enfhip  of  the  deferters  from  the 
llalif;ix,  who  were  demanded,  gave  the  documents  in  relation  to  the 
deferters  from  the  Melampiis,  wiio  were  not  demanded,  but  wh« 
being  found  among  the  ciew  of  the  Chefapeake,  were  taken  out. 
Thefe  documents  were  publiflied  and  applied  to  fupport  the  pro- 
ilaniation,  and  to  prove  that  the  Rritifli  officers  made  an  attack 
iov  tlie  recovery  of  native  Americans.  Tliis  is  now  known  to  br 
faUe.     For  an  explication  of  this  point,  fee  the  notes.^ 

*  StMiiirn  who  dofcrtcd  from  the  Hati(':ix,  Lord  James  Townfliend,  and  whn 
wcri'  It)  Dttcn  i/.w.T /;./(,/,  and  for  wliom  the  attack  on  the  (,'helapeake  was  made, 

v'l:,  Richard  Hidicrt,  ot  Liverpool,"!    demanded,  but  efcapcd  from  the  Chcfa- 
1  IiMiry  SaiiiidcrH,  of  (ireenock,  [  do.  do.  [peake. 

Jcnkin  Katford,  of  London,        >  demanded  and  taken, 
(ii()ri;e  North,  of  Kiiil ale,  j    demanded,  but  clcapcd  from  the  Cheti- 

^^'illiam  Hill,  of  I'hil  idelpliia,  J  do.  do.  (pcakr. 

\S.-c  ll'!  .cntiiuulkii  c/ll't  iitir  i'l  tic  nixt  fiugeA 


'      i! 

1 


■lisft^'tOr,-- 


lb 


/i 


In  faitt  no  evidcnco  lias  yet  bcLii,  and  no  cviJcncc  fver  can  h^ 
adduced  to  prove  that  tlie  Jiiinun  dtmanJid,  ai'd  wliofe  protcftion 
by  us  was  t\w  Jiy/f  caufv  of  attack,  were  Americans  ;  becaufe  tlu'y 
were  and  have  bicn  proved  by  tlie  higheil  cvideiicc  to  be  native 
Br'ilijh  feamciu 

But  llnce  the  cafe  of  the  incu  taken  from  tlie  Milampus,  has 
been  blended  with  tliat  of  the  others,  let  us  fee  how  the  fafts  turu 
out  as  to  them. 

Inllead  of  fupporting  the  proclamation »  as  to  the  fad  of  their 
hav'ina  been  nfccrlained  io  be  native  citizens,  it  turns  out,  that  Capt. 
Barron  liad  hniply  taken  the  Jlory  of  the  culprits  :  It  turns  out 
furtlier,  that  one  of  them  \."as  born  at  Bonaire,  in  Spaniih  Amer- 
lica,  and  was  not  even  a  .  -.izen  of  the  United  States  ;  that  the  two 
others  were  black  men,  born  (laves  in  Maryland,  and  ilriclly  there- 
fore, not  native  citizens,  \.\\o\ig\\  ualives.  That  they  all  io\(\  Cvi\^K, 
I'»arron  a  falfehood,  in  Hating  tliat  they  had  been  impreffcd  on 
boaii!  the  Melampus,  bceaufe  tliey  referred  to  thcii  former  mailer, 
Capt.  Crafts,  who  Hales,  that  he  fufpefted  and  charged  them  with 
theft  in  England,  that  they  therefore  abfronded,  and  in  order  to 
proteA  thenifelvcs,  entered  on  board  the  Melampus  vuluntarily. 
Capt.  Crafts,  pleafed,  probably,  with  getting  rid  of  fuch  rafcals, 
never  demanded  them  either  of  the  Captain  of  the  Melampus,  or  of 
the  Britiili  Loverrment,  after  they  were  enlifled,  and  they  remain- 
ed ou  board  that  frigate  till  they  again  deferted  from  her  in  our 
country. 

iSome  honeft  men  doubt,  whether  the  Britiili  officers  had  a  right 
to  enlift  thefe  men  ;  and  if  they  had,  whether  they  could  reclaim 
them  from  us,  after  defertion. 

Protelting  that  it  has  no  connexion  with  the  affair  of  the  Chefa- 
peake,  tlicy  not  being  the  nun  (IdHtiniliJ,  J  would  obferve,  that  it  is 
not  competent  for  our  Government  to  deny  tiie  right  of  our  citi- 
zens to  cuter  into  foreign  fervice,  in  a  foreign  jurifdittion,  becaufe 
1ft.  The  jjrefent  adminillration  and  all  tlie  party  now  in  power  in 


.SiMtiicn  cli'fertcd  from  the  Mi'l.impiis, 
Jdliii  Straclian,  of  MaryLiiul,')    iiDt  ilciiiiindul,  but  taken. 

(III.  ill). 

Ho.  <iii. 


Jdliii  Straclian,  1)1  Maryl.iiuK'J 
William  Wan,  1)1  Mar'ylaiul,y 
iianici  Martin,  of  UonHiri.',    S 


17 


».he  United  St;  tes,  oppoled  the  plan  of  the  Wafhington  adminillra- 
lion  to  prohibit  fuch  condutt,  and  they  contended  that  a  citizen  in 
time  of  peace,  might  expatiate  himfelf  at  pleafure.  The  famous 
example  of  Commodore  Barney  mull  .je  in  every  one's  recolleftion. 

2dly.  The  Acl;  of  Congrefs  prohibiting  our  citizens  from  enter- 
ing into  foreign  fervice  within  our  c"un  territory,  is  a  ftrong,  and  al- 
moil  inefiftible  implication  that  they  may  do  It  in  other  countries. 

3dly.  The  late  anfwer  of  our  Government  to  the  Britifli  Min- 
ifter,  that  we  cannot  ftop  to  enquire  of  what  country  a  man  is  a 
fubjeA,  when  he  offers  himfelf  to  enhil  as  a  foldier  or  failor,  is  a 
perfeA  anfwer  to  us  upon  that  fubjcdl.  And  our  pradlicc  from  the 
commencement  of  our  Government  to  this  day,  of  inviting,  and 
naturalizing  the  citizens  of  all  countries,  even  of  nations  at  war, 
ought  to  make  us  perledly  fdent  on  this  topick. 

4thly.  If  a  man  has  a  ri^ht  to  enlift  in  a  foreign  country,  and 
does  fo  cnhft,  figns  the  articles  of  war,  receives  the  bounty  and 
wages,  he  becomes  to  all  intents  and  purpofes  a  fubjeft  of  his 
newly  ail'ipted  country,  and  all  our  claims  over  him,  and  his  to  our 
proteClion  abfolutely  eenfe.  To  illutlrate  this  cafe,  let  us  fuppofe 
that  Capt.  Barney  had  delivered  up  the  frigate  which  he  command- 
ed, to  the  Britifh  in  the  Chefapeake,  and  had  landed,  and  the 
Frencli  Government  had  demanded  the  delivery  of  him  for  the 
purpofe  of  puniflmient,  and  had  threatened  us  with  war,  in  cafe  of 
refiifal,  is  there  any  doubt  that  we  Ihould  liave  delivered  him  up  ? 
And  fliould  we  not  be  jnlUy  deemed  accomplices  of  his  crime,  if 
we  fliould  refufe  ? 

Now  tile  cafe  of  thefe  two  blaek  men,  is  precifely  the  fame  with 
that  of  Capt.  Barney. — Mr.  Jefferfon  calls  them  citizens  of  the 
United  States  ;  if  fo,  their  right  of  expatriation  is  aa  great  as  that  of 
Capt.  Barney,  or  of  Mr.  Jefferfon  ;  and  when  once  legally  entered 
into  foreign  fervice,  if  they  defert,  they  are  as  much  reclaimablc  as 
f  ither  of  the  others  would  be. 

I  have  briefly  confidered  the  cafe  of  thefe  men  belonging  to  the 
Melampus,  becaufe   lome  people  have  or  pretend  to  have,  fcruplcs 
»n  this  fubjed  ;  but  I  repeat,  that  the  cafe  of  thefe  men  forms  no 
part  of  the  real  queftion. 
C 


I 


1' 


iimmmmmtim 


i 


IS 


^f 


fl- 


[t  will  conllitute  no  piirt  of  the  difcunion  bclwccn  tlio  two 
iountric9  ;  it  does  not  afledl  the  merit  or  demerit  of  Admiral 
Berkeley  :  He  ordered  his  officers  to  take  Richard  Hubert,  Jen- 
kin  Ratford,  and  George  North,  thefe  were  all  native  Englilhmen. 
His  officers  coidd  find  but  one  of  thofe  men,  but  they  found  threi- 
others,  whom  they  had  no  orders  to  take,  but  who  were  deferters. 
If  they  were  millaken  in  thefe  three  lafl  men,  |'w/j;V/i//i<;v  w^rt 
not  J  and  had  no  right  to  take  them,  it  does  not  render  the  order 
for  taking  the  rni/  Eiigliffimen,  and  the  aftual  execution  of  it  by 
feizing  one  of  them  /fj's  correal.  My  brother  farmers,  will  under- 
itand  this  better,  if  J  put  a  cafe  jujl  like  it. — A  Sheriff  has  a  war- 
rant to  fearch  a  neiglibour's  barn  foi*  two  llolen  horfes,  fufpefted 
to  be  c'j'\.-alcd  there  :  He  enters,  and  finds  one  of  ihcjio/en  horfes, 
and  he  alfo  takes  a  cow,  which  he  thinks  was  ftolen  from  i.iiother 
neighbour.  Suppoie  it  fiiould  tUrn  out  that  lie  fhould  be  wron;.; 
as  to  the  cozu  ;  does  it  render  the  warnnU  for  the  iiorfe  illeg-al, 
\\  lien  he  really  found  one  of  the  (lolen  horfes  concealed  theiX'  ? 

Thus,  then  I  have  confidered,  and  ihitcd  all  the  fadts  as  yet 
afcertained,  as  to  the  caufe  of  this  attack  ;  and  it  appears,  that  four 
iintive  Biilifh  feamen  and  deferters,  who  deferted  in  our  territory, 
were  eonlrary  to  orders  enliiled  and  entered  in  our  lliip  Chefapeake  ; 
that  they  were  demanded  of  the  inferiour  officer?,  and  laiUy  of  the 
Government,  and  were  not  delivered  ; — that  a  forcible  attack  was 
made  to  recover  thefe  men  ;  and  though  three  of  thorn  had  efcaped, 
one  was  aftually  found  concealed  on  board  of  our  (hip  ;  and  that 
twenty  Briti/h  lailors  were  found  to  have  been  entered  on  board  of 
her. 

I  fiiall  now  proceed  to  examine  the  principles  of  the  Law  ol 
Nations  on  this  subjed,  and  whether  we  were  in  good  faith  obliged 
to  deliver  up  thefe  deferters  ? 

The  firft  queftion  which  prefents  itfelf  on  this  point  is,  how  far 
the  fubjects  of  a  nation  in  time  of  war,  have  a  right  to  expatriate 
themfelves,  or  to  enlill  in  foreign  fervice,  even  in  ordinary  cafes, 
where  tliey  have  not  entered  into  fpccial  engagements  with  their 
Sovereign  ? — On  this  point  all  the  writers  on  the  Law  of  Nations, 
moft  of  wlu)m  are  on  the  fide  of  freedom,  and  the  privileges  of  tin,- 
citizen,   agree,   that   fubjefts  not  in  publick  employ,  cannot  exp;i. 


■■"T:^ 


19 


-en  tiu-  two 
')f  Admiral 
lubert,  Jeii- 

f>»imd  thm- 

e  defertcrs. 
(h  tbiy  were 

r  tlie  order 
ion  of  it  by 

will  uiider- 
•as  a  war- 
liifpcafd 
'"Icn  fiorfes, 
i>m  iiiothcr 
1  I>i'  wronj; 
>ife  illegal, 

tlici-e  i 
atts  as  yet 

tliat  Join 

territory, 

'IJy  of  the 
ttack  wa;: 
J  elcapcd, 

and  that 

board  of 

Law  ol 
J  obliged 

how  far 
f  patriate- 
ly  cafes, 
ith  thcii- 
Nations, 
s  of  tin.- 
>t  exp,!. 


triatc  tliemfelvcs  while  their  nation  is  at  ivar.  Burlamaiiui,  V'attel, 
(irotius,  and  Puffendorf,  all  hold  the  fame  opinions,  ^ut  a&  it  would 
exceed  the  limits  of  this  elTay,  to  quote  the  opinions  of  all  of  them 
at  large,  I  fliall  coi  "  le  myfelf  to  tliofe  of  Grotius,  a  Dutch  writer, 
whofe  exce'lent  treatife  on  the  rights  of  War  and  Peace,  has  been 
lonfjdereJ  a  llandard  work  upon  this  fubjeiS. 

In  the  XXIVtli  feAion  of  his  Vth  chapter,  he  lays  it  down  as  a 
general  principle,  tiiat  the  fubjeds  of  any  nation  may  change  their 
country  at  pleafure,  to  which  general  rule,  he  makes  the  following 
exceptions  : — "  And  yet  herein  alfo,  we  arc  to  fubmit  to  natural 
equity,  tliat  it  (liould  not  be  lawful  when  the  publick  was  damnified 
by  it. —  Tor  as  Proculus  obferves,  always  not  tliat  which  is 
profitable  to  fome  one  of  the  fociety  i^  uhully  to  bo  obferved,  but 
what  is  expedient  for  the  <whok. 

**  But  it  is  expc-dient  for  the  whole,  that  in  cafe  any  great  debt 
be  contratU'd,  no  citizen  fliould  forfake  the  city,  until  he  have 
iVil  paid  tm  proportiun  of  it.  Alfo,  if  upon  confidence  of  the  number 
of  iheir  citizens,  they  have  begun  a  ivar,  but  cfpecially  if  they  are 
in  danger  to  tie  iejie^ed,  uo  citizen  ought  to  forfake  it,  till  he  hav(.' 
firft  provided  a  perft)n  as  able  as  himfclf  to  defend  the  Conimon- 
w.alth." 

In  this  point  all  tlic  writers  on  the  Law  of  Nations,  are  agreed, 
and  if  they  had  been  filent,  the  didatcs  of  common  fent'e  and  natur- 
al  equity,  and  the  lirtl  principles  of  the  focial  compad,  would  have 
decided  the  queilion. 

In  the  cafe  of  Great-Britain,  a!'  ♦Ho  reafoning  of  Grotius,  applies 
to  the  contelt  in  which  (he  is  now  engaged. 

It  will  not  b--  denied  that  flie  has  undertaken  this  war  "  in  con- 
fidence of  the  number,  and  abihty  of  her  fubjeds  ;"  nor  will  it  be 
queiUoned,  "  tiiat  (he  is  not  only  in  danger,  but  is  adually  threat- 
ened with  being  lufte^ed"  by  the  moll  formidable  power  which  the 
world  has  ever  I'een.  We  cannot  therefore,  refill  the  conclufu);! 
of  Grotius,  that  no  private  citizen  of  Great-Britain  has  a  right  to 
forfake  his  country,  without  providing  a  pcrfon  equally  able  to  do 
^end  the  Commonwealth. 

]  f  this  dodrine  is  true  with  refped  to  private  citizens,  who  are 
only  bound  by  a  tacit  and  implied  contrad,  how  much  ftronger  is 


, 


^ 


>  "Ji'-^te^.'- 


^^■^■'/^•imr^msifiimimmiutf, 


2U 


>, 


.1  t 


thf  piinciplo  when  appluil  to  pcrfoim  ii  publick  employ,  bound  by 
an  espirfs  aj',rcemi'nt,  obliged  by  thi-ir  b>\ving  received  the  pubhck 
money  for  their  fervices,  and  on  whofe  fkehty  the  cxiikncc  of  tho 
nation  more  immediately  depends  ? 

All  civilized  nations  have  unite''  ■'"  confideriiig  dcfertion  from 
publick  fervice,  one  of  the  mod  3  offences. 

In  America,  France,  and  Great>Britain,  it  has  been  often  punifli- 
ed  with  death. 

If  it  be  therefore  the  highell  crime,  and  one  of  the  greatell  inju- 
ries which  a  fubjedt  can  do  to  his  country  to  defert  its  fervice,  can 
it  be  nccelTary  to  prove  that  it  is  unlawful  for  a  friendly  nation  to 
receive,  encourage,  cnlift,  and  defend  by  force  fuch  deferlers  ? 

In  fupport  of  the  monilrous  opinion,  that  it  is  not  unlawful, 
fome  people  have  remarked,  that  by  the  modern  ufages  of  nations, 
criminals  who  have  committed  offences  hfs  llxtn  munlir  and j'ur^eryt 
arc  by  the  courtefy  of  fucli  nations,  not  demanded  when  they  efcapc 
out  of  their  own  country  uito  a  foreign  one. 

But  let  me  afli,  why  arc  murderers  and  forgers  excepted  from 
the  general  rule  ?  Is  it  not  alledged  to  be,  bccaufe  jullice  requires 
lliat  fuch  heinous  criminals  ihould  not  efcape  punidimcnt  ?  Bccaufe 
tlie  peace  of  the  nation,  whofe  laws  have  been  violated,  requires 
that  an  example  Ihould  be  made  of  fuch  great  offenders  i 

And  fuppole  tliat  it  fhoul/1  be  more  important  to  a  nation  to  re- 
quire tiie  delivery  of  her  military  deferters,  than  of  the  criminals 
abovementioncd,  would  flie  not  have  a  right  to  require  them  ? 

On  the  queilions  of  the  Colonial  trade  and  of  the  impreffmenl 
of  feaini'ii  f.oni  our  merchant  (hips,  our  Secretary  of  State  founds 
his  chief  argument  upon  the  fdencc  of  the  writers  of  the  Laws  of 
Nations  on  tliofe  fubjefts.  And  cannot  the  argument  be  retorted 
with  equal  force  on  this  point  ?  Not  a  diftum  can  be  produced  from 
any  writer  to  prove  that  neutral  or  friendly  nations  have  a  right  to 
proteft  ttie  deferters  from  the  fervice  of  belligerents.  And  yet  all 
thcfe  writers  difcufs  the  quefUon  how  far  nations  can  harbour  the 
cnmv'.nh  who  tfcnpe  from  other  nations  ;  and  if  any  fuch  right  as 
the  one  for  \\\\v:\\  fome  Americans  contend,  was  conceived  to 
'Xilt,  1;  tt  })()fTibio  tliat  fonic  ore  r)f  thefe  numerous  writer'.  woii!<i 
not  Ikim'  ir.er.tioiicd  it  ? 


■  XT  ^^W-^^*'*^-'^''^-' 


'2\ 


In  hi\  the  acknowledged  ufage  of  all  civilized  neutral  nations, 
in  rciloring  fiich  defertcrs  from  the  armies  or  fhips  of  natif)ns  at 
war,  the  abfoliite  nccelTity  of  fiich  an  ufage  to  the  cxiftemc  ol 
nations,  jierfedlly  account  for  this  filence.  A  fa6t  which  took 
place  the  lall  year,  in  our  own  country,  proves  that  the  French 
officers  view  it  in  this  light.  Admiral  Willaumez  met  with  an 
American  brig  at  fea  ;  he  found  in  her  four  dcferters,  who  had 
efcaped  from  the  Valeureufe  frigate.  Not  content  with  taking 
them  out,  he  writes  a  letter*  in  a  mofl  indignant  drain,  to  his  Minillev 
at  our  Court,  and  defircs  him  to  demand  fatisfaftion  for  this  mifcoii- 
ilufl  ; — not  for  the  mifconduC^  of  one  of  our  publick  officers,  in 
enlifting  his  men,  and  refufing  to  deliver  them  when  demanded,  but 
for  the  mifconduft  of  a  private  citizen,  in  daring  to  employ  men, 
who  had  been  once  in  the  fervice  of  his  Imperial  Majejly.  Thi.i 
cafe,  thougli  an  extravagant  one,  and  partaking  of  the  charafter  of 
Frencli  domination,  is  ilrong  evidence  of  the  general  underllanding 
of  military  men,  that  "  deferters  from  publick  fervice  cannot  be 
harboured." 

Such  feems  to  have  been  the  impreffion  of  our  own  Government, 


•  "To  (jcn.  Ti'RRF.;\u,  Frcncli  Anibadador  at  Wafliington. 

•'  MV  LORD, 

"  You  have  learnt  In'  tlu-  arrival  of  Conic  of  my  fcattcred  fliips  in  America, 
the  iint'ortuiiate  evtiit  liy  svliicli  tlii'v  wcri'  I'l'paratt'd  from  me."  [Here  Admi- 
ral Willaumez  yivcs  tlif  dftail  of  the  tiniptfl.  |  'I'hat  at  this  date  the  Foud- 
royant  was  nearly  new  ni;:(teil,  mil  proceeds  to  enforce  to  General  Turrreau, 
how  iiecelFary  it  wa^  that  the  iLips  whicli  had  put  into  the  American  ports  "i 
diftrefs,  lliould  hafteii  ti>  join  him  at  the  Havana,  where  his  iquadron  if  collev 
ed  and  united  to  the  S|,,uiil1i  forre  at  that  |)lace,  would  in  cfTec'l  oppofe  i 
ftroni,'  iquadron,  and  double  to  that  of  the  En;,'!ini,  who  at  Jamaica,  have  only 
two  line  of  battle  llli|l^.  Admiral  Willameuz  turtlier  lays,  that  he  purpofed 
goiii)^  to  Vera  Cruz,  a;'r(  <'at)!y  to  the  proicitof  the  jrovemment  of  the  Spanilh 
colony  of  Havana,  to  biinij  louie  millions  of  dollars,  which  he  ftates  will  he 
more  apropos,  as  the  Iri  mh  I'.inperor  had  a  rijfht  to  the  payment  of  one  mill- 
ion of  dollars  of  which  tin'  Irarcitv  was  verv  i^reat  at  the  illand  of  Cuba.  Ad- 
miral Willaumez  then  eoiitinues,  "  I  have  juft  apprehended  four  Teamen,  dd'ert- 
<rs  from  the  Valeureufe  tri;;ate,  wliich  I  found  on  board  an  American  brig, 
where  they  had  enj^agetl  a:  feventeeii  dollars  per  month.  Now,  fir,  if  you  can 
fucceed  in  makinji;  the  American  ;rovernment  pay  <lown  a  compeni'ation  for 
this  milcondurt,  in  feducln;r  thu-.  our  feamen,  vu  will  punifli  it  by  makinj!;  it 
fmart  in  that  point  in  whi.h  it  feels  mofl,  viz.  its  avarice  in  money,  and  with 
fo  much  the  more  julbce,  tliofe  peoj)!;.'  (meaning  tli  '  American  merchants)  have 
for  three  years  pafl  been  co.itinually  injuring  our  marine  by  feducing  our  belt 
leamen  from  us.  (Signed) 

I  e   C.  Ad.  P.  WILLAUMEZ, 
On  board  the  Foudmyant,  II;'.vana,  'J,7tli  Oclobcr,  1800." 


<  'I 


,  ? 


« 


i) 


and  its  orders  on  this  liihjtdl  arc  concliifiVL'  an  ugiiinl}  oiirfclvos.  (t 
(liri-rted  its  offjccrH  not  to  oiiliil  ilt ftrters  from  the  Br'tt'tjh  jh'ips  ; — if 
I  Ills  ordi-r  had  been  ijfutil  and  esecutal  in  j;ood  faith,  wc  fliould  liavc 
In-i'n  fully  acqflitfcd,  cvin  if  di-fortiTrt  had  been  unintentionally  en- 
tered and  found  on  board,  and  the  whole  weight  of  itnpmvohed  hof- 
lifif)'*  "''t'>  which  Great-liritain  has  been  charged,  would  have  rell- 
fd  upon  her  officers. — But  unhappily  for  us,  after  admitting  the 
Law  of  Nations  to  be  as  we  have  dated,  by  iffuing  the  abovemen- 
tioncd  order,  our  fubfequent  condurt  evinces  either  a  want  of  fuicer- 
ity  in  iffuing  that  uniti;  or  a  fubfequent  change  in  the  policy  which 
dirtatcd  it.  If  it  had  been  made  with  good  faith,  why  was  not  a 
regular  formal  encjuiry  made  upon  Mr.  Erfkine's  demand  ?  Why 
weiT  not  the  Britifh  officers  invited  to  point  out  the  men,  and  ex- 
hibit the  evidence  of  their  claim  to  them  ?  Was  not  the  demand  of 
a  piddiek  Minider  fufficiently  folemn,  and  did  it  not  require  fomc 
notice  and  i-efpeft  ?  Could  it  be  imagined  that  our  officers  could 
know  t/r  ffijir/n:t  by  intuition  ?  or  was  it  prrfiimfd  that  they  knew 
I  hem  to  be  on  board,  hi  dirrcl  breach  of  the  orders  aforcfaid,  not 
lo  enlill  tlioni  i' 

Will  it  be  contended,  that  they  w^re  ignorant,  who  they  were, 
aijd  that  they  relied  upon  the  culprits  coming  forth  of  their  own 
accnd,  out  of  a  crew  of  KH)  men,  and  faying  •'  Ecce  homines,  wo 
defevve  a  halter  :" 

It  is  apparent  to  evci-y  fair  and  candid  man,  that  if  the  order 
was  iiTiicd  in  good  faith,  when  the  liritifli  officers  gave  notice  that 
five  of  their  feamcn  were  cnliiled,  there  was  but  one  plain,  upright 
coiirfe — to  alk  the  Uritifli  officers  to  point  nut  the  men. 

But  would  you  deliver  up  men  upon  the  mere  declaration  of 
Hriiiflt  officers  ?  !  ! — Do  not  be  alarmed,  I  would  not  ; — but  I 
would  inftitute  an  offcial  enquiry,  in  wliich  the  BritiHi  officers  as 
ptofccutors,  fliuuld  be  permitted  to  exhibit  their  pioofs  of  their 
claim  to  the  men  charged  ;  and  the  alledged  deferters  fliould  have 
ample  time,  and  the  aid  of  Government  to  fubllantiate  their  claims 
to  our  protection. 

This  was  tlu-  courfe  of  nature,  of  tiutli,  of  good  faith,  of  national 

iufticc.      It  was  tlie  way   to   avoid   niifunderllanding,  to  fave   the 

;ves  of  oi'.r  citi/.ei;s,  which  have  been  dcllroyed  in   confequcnce  of 


ihc  ncyledt  of  ihis  courfc,  to  avoid  IVar,  with  whkh  wc  arc  threat- 
ened. 

There  is  nothing  in  this  procedure  derogatory  to  our  national 
honour.  It  was  rcferving  the  jurifdiftion  and  trial  of  the  qucftion 
to  our/elves.  It  would  have  gi\en  perfed  I'atibfadtion  to  all  par- 
ties, and  would  have  heightened  the  confidence  of  all  nations  in  our 
good  faith. 

It  was  peculiarly  proper  in  this  cafe,  becaufe  the  alledged  defer- 
tion  had  taken  place  in  our  own  territory,  witile  the  (hips  of  a 
friendly  power  were  under  our  proteA'on.  We  were  therefore 
bound  to  know,  or  at  leail  to  enquire  into  the  fads,  and  to  rcndei 
juftice.  y/  refpetl  to  our  territorial  rights,  alone  prevented  the  Brit- 
ifli  from  retaking  tiieir  criminals  by  frefli  purfuit.  A  rcfpett  to 
ourfelves,  and  to  the  obligations  of  an  impartial  neutrality,  required 
that  we  fhould  render  them  thatjujlice  which  their  rc/piil  for  us  pre- 
vented them  from  doing  for  tiiemfelves. 

But  why  was  not  this  natural  and  fair  courfe  of  procedure  adopt- 
ed ?  Tile  hillory  of  the  cafe  gives  the  anfwer.  Upon  futli  an  in- 
velligatUMi  and  enquiry,  the  deferterr.  from  the  Hahfax  would  have 
all  turned  out  to  be  native  Brililh  fubjetla  •,  of  courfe  there  could 
liave  been  no  apology  for  not  rejluring  them.  On  the  other  hand, 
to  reilorc  to  tliofe  enemies  of  the  human  race,  as  I  have  heard  fome 
perfons  call  them  (hojles  humani  generis)  the  very  means  by  whicli 
they  were  to  annoy  the  fleet  of  our  illuflrious  friend,  the  Emperor 
of  the  Welt,  and  tliis  in  tlie  very  face  of  his  augujl  reprefentative, 
would  have  been  to  hazard  the  difpleafure  of  our  lirmell,  failell 
friend.  In  other  words,  deep  rooted,  and  cultivated  antipathy  to 
Great-Britain,  and  an  habitual  dread,  as  well  as  iincere  partiality  to 
France,  forbad  the  adoption  of  any  meafures,  which,  by  conciliating 
the  former,  would  tend  to  render  the  Litter  more  jealous  of  us. 

But  fome  lionell,  and  a  few  able  and  refpeftable  men,  who  go 
along  with  us  in  oui  opinions  to  this  point,  who  agree,  that  the 
pradice  of  enliiling  Britifh  deferters  is  extremely  wrong,  and  a  vi- 
olation of  neutrality,  and  even  in  the  opinion,  that  our  own  conduft 
ill  tliis  affair  might  juilify  hoJIiUties  from  the  government  of  Great- 
Britain,  flill  contend  that  Berkeley  had  no  fuch  right,  that  it  b?- 
Lnged  only  to  his  govcrnmcut  to  wage  war. 


t  'I 


I 


i.«*<*vf5«*r'*^-4««i*n>-. 


u 


% 


If 


I 


To  this  opinuMi  two  anlwers  may  he  given,  both  of  which  air 
pt'ifettly  fatisfaAory  : — lil,  That  although  this  dodlrine  may  be 
gonerally  true,  and  it  certainly  very  much  conduces  to  the  peace  of 
nations  to  maintain  it,  yet  it  is  an  affair  altogether  between  the 
Jubaltern  officer  and  his  governmenf.  Surely  no  man  will  be  fo  mad 
as  to  contend,  that  Admiral  Berkeley's  having  done  this  aft  with- 
out the  authority  of  his  government,  is  a  greater  cauf  of  complaint, 
a  greater  infult,  or  a  more  juftifiable  ground  of  hollility,  than  if 
the  Britifli  government  had  ordered  it.  If,  therefore,  that  govern- 
ment, after  reviewing  all  the  condudl  of  that  officer,  and  the  cir- 
cumftanccs  of  provocation,  fliall  approve  tlie  fteps  he  took,  it  will 
(land  precifely  on  the  fame  footing,  as  if  Mr.  Erfkine  had  reported 
our  refufal  to  deliver  the  deferters  to  his  government,  and  that  gov- 
ernment had  iffued  an  order  to  re-feize  the  men  by  force. 

'idly,  It  is  a  great  miftake  to  fay,  that  a  fubaltern  officer  can  in 
li  cafe  whatever,  of  his  own  auliiority,  make  reprifals  or  commit 
an  ait  of  hoRility.  It  is  true  tliat  military  men  arc  coniidered  in 
a  great  meafurc  as  machines,  in  the  hands  of  their  fupcriors  ;  they 
are  bound  to  obey  orders,  and  can  exercife  their  difcretinn  fo  far 
only  as  is  necejfary  to  the  execution  of  thofe  orders.  But  if  in  the 
courfe  of  fuch  duty,  an  unexpcfted  incident  takes  place,  which 
goes  to  defeat  the  objeft  of  their  orders,  that  fame  military  llrict- 
nefs  requires  that  they  (ViOuld  remove  fuch  obftacle  if  practicable. 
An  officer  is  fent,  as  was  the  commander  of  the  Britilh  fleet  in 
Hampton  roads,  to  watch  and  prevent  the  efcape  of  an  enemy — 
he  lands  the  guns  of  one  of  his  (hips  to  careen  her. — A  neutral  (hip 
of  war,  direftly  before  his  eyes,  lands  and  puts  the  gunt  on  board, 
and  proceeds  Ui  fea — will  any  man  be  fo  unrealbnable  as  to  contend. 
tli;it  the  Britifli  officer  cannot  purfue  fuch  (hip,  demand  his  guns, 
and  on  refufal,  compel  by  force  the  furrender  (<f  them  i*  Shall  he 
fubniit  to  fee  the  objeft  of  his  expedition  defeated,  and  report  tc 
his  government  that  he  conceived  it  to  be  more  proper  that  the 
guns  fliould  be  diplomatically  demanded  ? 

But,  fay  fome  other  objedors,  ti  lie,  in  extreme  cafes,  the  law  of 
felf-prefervation  will  juilify  an  inferior  officer  in  making  forcible  re- 
pri(als,but  was  the  cafe  of  Admiral  Berkeley  fuch  an  urn  !'  My  an- 
fwer  is,  that  every  officer  fo  entrulled,  mull  judge  for  himfelf.     lip 


■'^^t.V'^'^'WS^'*^ ' 


25 


takes  his  honour  and  life  in  one  hand,  and  his  fword  in  the  other. 
If  his  government  juftifies  him,  he  efcapes — if  flie  condemns,  he  falls. 

But  that  Admiral  Berkeley  had  reafon  to  apprehend  a  total  de- 
ftruftion  of  the  Britifh  fquadron  on  our  coafts,  the  following  fafts 
fcem  toeftablifh  : — 1ft,  It  is  alledged  that  defertion  had  become  fo 
frequent  that  the  Britifti  fquadron  had  loft  nearly  an  hundred  men, 
between  March  and  June,  and  great  rewards  had  been  offered  at 
Halifax,  by  the  Province,  for  the  apprehenfion  of  thcfe  deferters. 
2dly,  Although  Captain  Barron  gave  fuch  wretched  protection  to 
the  deluded  men  who  entered  on  board  his  (hip,  ftill  the  example 
was  fo  contagious,  that  immediately  after  three  men  deferted,  landed 
near  Hampton,  and  were  fecreted  by  our  inhabitants.  Nineteen 
Britifh  feamen  rofe  upon  a  Britifh  cutter,  and  brought  her  into  the 
Delaware,  where  they  landed,  were  protected,  and  have  not  been 
delivered  up  ;  on  the  contrary,  our  newfpapers  congratulated  "  thefe 
much  injured  and  high  fpirtted  men  "  on  their  fuccefs.  Six  men  ran 
away  with  a  boat  of  the  Columbine,  at  New- York — and  fix  more 
landed  at  New- York,  from  the  Jafon,  and  are  all  concealea  in  our 
country  : — and  lallly,  fixty-five  failors  rofe  upon  their  officers,  in 
the  Jafon,  with  the  intent  of  efcaping  to  om  friendly  fhores — and 
they  would  have  fucceeded,  had  it  not  been  for  the  timely  and 
fpirited  interference  of  their  officers.  This  frigate  has  fince  arrived 
at  Halifax,  with  fifty  of  her  crew  in  irons,  fo  that  her  cruife  againil 
her  lawful  enemy  was  defeated.  Can  any  one  deny,  after  thefe  ex- 
amples, that  the  cafe  was  fo  extreme  as  to  juftify  an  officer  in  re- 
forting  to  force,  after  every  other  means  had  failed  ? 

But  it  muft  not  be  forgotten  that  the  true,  and  indeed  only 
real  qucftion  between  the  two  nations  is,  whether  the  fafts  which 
preceded  the  attack  on  the  Chefapeake,  amounted  to  fuch  a  provo- 
cation, that  if  reported  to  the  government  of  Great-Britain,  that 
government  would  have  been  authorized  to  make  reprifals,  or  even 
to  declare  war  againft  us  ? — Let  any  man  confult  the  writers  on 
the  Law  of  Nations,  or  his  own  feelings  of  moral  propriety,  and 
decide.  This  is  certain,  that  as  a  belligerent  nation,  we  fhould 
be  the  la/l  to  fubmit  to  a  principle,  which  in  its  operation 
would  completely  defeat  the  beft  concerted  military  eiitcrprifes. 
And  ive  fliould  think  that  our  moderation  had  been  fuffiriontlv 

1) 


intmti%*M*f-...'miK. 


'J(j 


\   V. 


li 


manifefted,  if,  after  tlircc  fcveial  inferior  demands,  our  piiblick  mln- 
ifters  had  made  afoniial  demand  of  nii'^lhcr  fovemgn,  and  been  re^ 
fitfcd  redrefs. 

But  admit.  If  it  he  pnjfibk,  that  all  the  reafoning  wc  have  citid  is 
ivrnng^  and  that  we  have  good  caufe  of  war  againU  Great-Britain, 
d(H>s  it  follow,  that  war  is  neccjjar'ily  to  be  undet taken  ?  Are  there 
110  cafes  in  which  war,  though  juilifiable,  may  be  avoided,  without 
dilhononr  \  Let  us  liilen  to  Grotiuson  that  point  : — "  It  is  better 
fomctimes  to  remit  our  oivn  right,  than  to  engage  in  a  doubtful  war 
for  it,''  "  efpccially  if  undertaken  to  exntl  punijhment" — which  \:< 
precifely  the  cafe  in  this  inllance.  We  have  no  principle,  no  inter- 
clt,  no  motive  for  war,  but  Ko  exaH  punifhment  m  a  {/oiil'/J'iif  cixfc. 
Again  fays  Grotius,  "  No  prudent  man  will  adventure  in  fuch  an 
cnterprife,  where  good  fuccefs  fhall  bring  little  profit,  but  where 
tlie  lead  mifearriage  may  prove  fatal."  "  Grant  tliat  our  griev- 
ances ate  unjuft,  and  unworthy  to  be  borne,  yet  it  will  not  follow, 
that  wc  ought,  by  driving  againll  them,  to  make  our  coiulil'tor. 
ivorfe."     -Apply  it  to  owr  prcfmt  cnff. 

If  wcfucceed  in  the  war,  wc  gain  the  right  to  cover  a  few  Britifi^ 
dcferters,  whom  wc  do  not  want,  and  which,  as  Grotius  fays,  will 
bring  little  profit  ;  but  we  hazard  our  lives,  our  liberties,  our  gov- 
ernment— we  do  iir.t  hazard  our  property  ;  tliat,  together  witli 
our  neutral  advantages,  will  i/nvitiddy  go  to  enrich  our  enemy.  But 
fome  people  fay,  we  do  not  go  to  war  for  liritiJJj  difcrfirs — thole 
we  do  uot  ivittit — we  are  better  without  them — we  go  to  w  ar  to 
make  Great-Britain  give  up  the  right  o[ fearch  o^  owrjl.vps  ( f  ni'iir. 

Tliiii  is  one  of  thofe  irrors  which  certain  artful  nun  have  pur- 
pofely  inteiwoven  with  the  cafe  of  the  Chefapeake,  with  which  it 
lias  iir,  roiiiir\ion.  Great-Britain  does  not  claim  this  right — (he  will 
renounce  it  bv  treaty — flie  at  t/jis  moment  abfolutely  difdaims  it." 
The  cafe  of  the  Chefapeake  was  not  grounded  upon  it  ;  it  was  a 
;v/>;-//<i/ for  a  wrong  d(ine  by  us ;  for  a  wrong  for  which  remedy 
had  been  refufcd  ;  and  it  is,  by  the  Law  of  Nations,  the  only  rent' 
cdy  fliort  rf  nvar. 


'  It  is  not  iin|iri»l)al)le  fliat  Adniinil  lU  rkili'y  will  lie  recilkil  to  arccrt.iln 
falislaolmily  wluthcr  tlif  alTair  ot  the  Chifapi-akc  is  trulv  a  iiifliCi  iMi'  ao>  nl 
loprifal,  fir  tlic  airuinptien  of  a  j;;oiifral  ri^lit  to  I'li'ich  piiblitk  (liip^,  wliic!'. 
I.iUl'1-  llity  iliiclaini. 


27 


U  was  no  more  founded  on  the  right  of  fearch,  tlian  if  one  of 
our  Ihips  on  the  fiigh  feas,  In  time  of  peace,  Ihould  forcibly  iL-ize  a 
boat  belonging  to  a  Britifli  fliip,  with  a  hcutenant  and  crew  on 
board,  and  fliould  liold  them  in  durefs  after  demand  ;  and  thereupon 
the  Britifh  captain  fliould  attack  and  difable  our  fliip,  and  retake 
his  men  ;  botli  thefe  aAs  are  equally  reprifals  for  previous  injuries, 
and  are  both  founded  on  tlie  laws  of  nature  and  nations. 

1  a(k,  once  more,  is  war  always  to  be  undertaken,  when  it  is 
luftifiable  ? 

I  anfwcr,  our  own  pradlicc  proves  the  contrary.  France  captur- 
I'd  our  fliips  in  violation  of  the  treaty  of  177^* — flie  afterwards  fet 
np  tlie  abominable  doftrine  of  the  role  tPc/^iiipa^e,  and  condemned 
millions  upon  it — flie  afterwards  decreed,  that  all  neutral  veifels, 
having  one  dollar's  value  of  Britifli  manufactures  on  board,  fln)uld, 
tojrether  with  their  cargoes,  be  lawful  pri^e  ;  and  feveral  more 
millions  fell  under  this  pretext. 

All  thefe  aAs  were  violations  of  the  law  of  nations — all  of  them 
\sere  niii/e  i,f  'zi'ar — yet  we  did  not  }<o  to  war — we  maile  a  treaty, 
a'ul  inllead  of  her  maLing  either  acknnivleilgment  or  fatisfacti'jn  ior  ei- 
ther of  thefe  injuries,  we  explicitly  renounced  all  claims  to  them. 

Spain  (hut  the  port  of  New-Orleans,  contrary  to  treaty — liie  did 
it  with  marked  infolence — flie  has  fuice  marched  ai  nied  men  into  our 
territory,  feized  our  citizens,  and  lately  has  taken  puflefTion  of  fome 
of  our  national  military  llores — Hill  we  have  not  made  war  upon 
Spain,  though  war  would  have  been  jullifiable,  and  though,  both 
witli  regard  to  France  and  Spain,  we  had  given  no  caufe  "f  fffcnc, 
as  we  have  done  in  this  cafe  to  Great-Britain. 

If  it  bi-  afl<ed,  how  it  hapiiens  that  the  men  who  were  in  favour 
of  war  with  France  and  Spain,  are  oppoled  to  one  with  Great- 
Britain— I  ani'wer.  111,  That  the  injuries  of  France  and  Spain  were 
unprovoked,  and  therefore  atrocious  :  'Jd,  That  thofe  of  Great- 
Britain  have  been />/-'3'i"';/W,  even  by  the  acknowledgment  of  our 
government,  who  ordered  its  officers  not  to  enlill  deferters,  which  or- 
ders were  openly  ilifokyeit — and  therefore  the  eaufe  of  war  is  doubtful : 
but  lailly,  Such  was  the  local  aiul  political  iituation  of  France  and 
Spain,  that  they  could  not  injure  us,  wliile  tiiey  were  at  war  witli 
Great -Britain.     .An  impaiUible  gulph  lies  between  us — but  we  are 


t\ 


I 


J 


^>*mmimmmmmm . 


:\* 


I 


vi 


W 


l\ 


vulnerable  at  every  pore  by  Great-Britain.  By  her  immenfe  and 
gigantick  naval  force,  flie  comes  in  contaft  with  us  in  every  fea. 
To  deftroy  our  commerce,  would  be  mere  fport  to  her  marine  ;  and 
although  the  Editor  of  the  National  Intelligencer,  and  his  patrons, 
may  think  the  ruin  of  250,000  merchants  a  matter  of  fuch  perfeft 
indifference,  that  he  will  not  fuifer  it  to  mar  a  fine  calculation,  yet 
the  people  of  New-England  feel  differently.  They  know  that  they 
are  neceffnrily  a  commercial  people  ;  they  have  not  one  million 
flaves  to  labour  for  their  fupport  ;  they  live  by  the  fweat  of  their 
fwn  brows  ;  their  fons,  their  kinfmen,  their  friends,  are  engaged  in 
commerce  ;  and  we  farmers  of  the  northern  ftates,  are  not  fo  fool- 
ifti  as  to  believe  that  you  can  deftroy  commerce  without  inflifting  a 
deep  wound  upon  the  interefts  of  agriculture. 

We  are  now  naturally  led  to  confidcr  the  expediency  of  war,  in 
relation  to  our  means  of  annoyance,  refources,  probable  loffes,  and 
general  cffefts. 

In  eftimating  thefe  various  branches  of  this  extenfivc  quellion  of 
expediency,  I  flial!  not  enter  much  into  the  details,  but  fhall  Halo 
them  with  all  poffible  brevity,  confiftent  with  perfpicaity. 

Our  means  of  annoyance,  and  refources  as  ftatedby  the  advocates 
of  war,  are  of  two  fpeciea,  direft  and  indireft,  military  and  commer- 
cial. 

Of  our  military  refnurces  one  would  think  that  but  little  need  be 
faid.  The  jealoufy  of  muitary  force  always  fufficicntly  ftrong,  has 
been  ftrengtliened  by  our  philofophick  adminiftration  ;  the  neceflity 
of  conforming  to  the  falfe  opinions  and  prejudices  by  which  they  ac- 
quireu  power,  has  obliged  them  to  deftroy  even  the  little  military 
and  naval  force,  wliich  their  predecefTors  had  buiU  up.  The  Prefi- 
diMit  has  taught  the  people  to  believe,  that  the  experience  of  all 
nations  and  of  all  ages,  was  of  no  avail  ;  that  all  his  prcdeceflbrs  iu 
power,  from  Saul  to  Bonaparte,  have  been  miftaken  in  believing  ia 
the  neceility  of  force  in  order  to  maintain  ufpeci  ;  that  the  fenfe  of 
juftice  is  the  firmeft  hold,  and  reafon  the  moft  effectual  weapon  to 
protcdi  our  rights,  or  to  avenge  injuries.  With  this  all  conquering 
weapon  he  has  marched  boldly  on,  till  he  has  brought  us  into 
the  field  with  a  foe,  who  hiving  bee.i  challenged  to  meet  us  there, 
will  take  the  liberty  to  ufe  his  own  weapons. 


I 


lenfe  and 
|every  fea. 

ine  ;  and 

patrons, 

:h  perfcft 

lation,  yet 

that  they 

|e   million 

of  their 

|ngaged  in 

3t  fo  fool- 

infliding  a 

f  war,  in 
loflcs,  and 

neilion  of 
/hall  Haw 


advocates 
I  cotnmcr- 


le  need  be 
rong,  has 

ncccflity 
1  they  ac- 
!  military 
he  Prefi. 
ice  of  all 
:i'fror8  ill 
ii'ving  in 

fenfe  of 
-■apon  to 
iquering 

us  into 
IS  there, 


29 


If  our  little  band  of  3000  foldiers,  could  be  drawn  off  from  the 
defence  of  a  frontier  of  5000  miles,  and  from  onr  tottering  forts, 
more  dangerous  to  their  defenders  than  their  aflailants,  and  if  Mr. 
Jefferfon  could  by  the  force  of  reafon,  perfuade  our  enemies  to 
enter  a  fmall  defile,  like  that  of  Thermopylae,  perhaps  even  this 
little  knot  of  heroes  might  be  immortalized  by  victory.  So  alfo, 
if  our  enemies  would  be  gracioufly  pleafcd  to  run  their  line  of  baitle 
fhips  aground  in  convenient  numbers,  Mr.  Jeffcrfon's  naval  force 
would  be  found  very  effective,  or,  which  would  be  ftill  more  con- 
venient, and  good  humoured  on  the  part  of  our  enemies,  if  they 
would  fend  one  (hip  at  a  time,  to  permit  Mr.  Fulton  to  make  three 
or  four  experiments,  we  could  in  the  courfe  of  two  years,  deftroy 
the  BritiHi  navy. 

But  we  have  100,000  militia,  and  we  can  by  the  very  cheap 
procefs  of  an  adt  of  Congrcfs,  incrrafe  this  number  at  pleafure.  If 
the  war  was  to  be  a  defenfive  one,  like  the  laft,  it  muft  be  admit  ■ 
ted,  that  this  fpecies  of  force  may  be  calculated  upon.  But  the 
militia  cannot  be  marched  out  of  the  United  States,  and  we  have 
no  ufe  for  them  ivithin. 

But  they  would  volunteer  their  fervices  to  take  Canada  and  No- 
va>Scotia. — I  do  not  fay  that  this  achievement  is  impoflible  ;  but  1 
am  furprifed,  that  our  publick  writers  fliould  be  fo  little  fparing  ot 
our  feelings,  as  to  recal  thofe  two  fcencs  of  our  misfortune. — The 
plains  of  Abraham,  and  the  Hlhmus  of  Pcnobfcot,  exhibit  no  hon. 
ourable  monuments  of  either  our  power  or  conduft. 

But  perhaps  we  miglit  have  better  fuccefs  in  another  attempt  ; 
perhaps  with  the  lofs  of  twenty  tliouGind  men,  and  the  expenfe  of 
fifty  millions  of  dollars,  we  might  take,  and  j^  irrifon  thofe  piovinces, 
with  the  exception  of  the  city  of  Quebeck  ;  that  city  we  probably 
could  not  take.*     Suppofe   us   then  in  quiet  poiTeffion  of  thefe 


•  It  is  fiirpriling  with  what  confitltnoc  men  wlio  are  totally  iffnoraiit  of  tli' 
Rate  ot  tlicfe  provinces,  l)oaft  of  taking:;  them  at  a  ftrokc.  Quthcck  was  in  .< 
ruinous  fituation  when  attacked  before,  and  yet  we  failed  in  our  attcmi)t,  thoujjii 
we  had  two  armies  before  it. — It  has  lince,  been  thorougiily  fortified,  and  i- 
now  the  Oibraltar  of  America.  M'v  have  no  reafon  to  doubt,  that  it  would 
hold  out  ajjainft  the  iv/joti-  Fnmh  army,  .It  le.id  as  \m\g  as  Dantzick.  W'c  on 
tlie  other  hand,  are  deftitute  of  en^finters,  or  military  llvill  (iifficient  for  fncii  an 
operation.  But  we  fliall  he  told,  that  we  ihall  liave  i'rench  officers,  Frcncli  fkill 
rrenrli  HrtiUery.— And  is  this  our  confjiti.n  ■'    Hie  mctus !  hcu  hbertas ! 


I 


'   1 


f,ixjr- 


—»»« 


/J 


'■1li*mm,§Mtk!!)m^ 


)v 


!'. 


u 


fi 


:;() 


provinces  ;  of  what  bciu-fit  will  they  be  to  lis,  or  v.liat  injury  the 
lofs  of  them  to  our  enemy  ?  To  her  they  have  been  a  conilant 
fourec  of  cxpenfe.  To  us  the  om^  would  add  a  mafs  of  population, 
hollile  to  us  in  feelings,  language,  manners,  religion,  and  attached, 
iincercly,  and  irrevocably  fo,  to  the  nation  whofe  power  and  afcend- 
ancy  w  have  the  highcll  reafon  to  dread.  Every  Canadian  is  a 
Frenchman  at  heart  ;  flaves  to  their  priclls,  they  can  eafily  be  pcr- 
fuaded  to  join  the  imperial  banner  of  France,  whenever  the  Empe- 
ror lawfully  authorized  by  the  Sovereign  Pontiff,  Ihall  think  proper 
to  difplay  it. 

Fifty  thoufand  Canadians,  difciplined  by  French  veteran  officers, 
after  cffeCling  a  june^tion  with  .K^OOO  Louilianians,  who  are  equally 
I'rcucb  in  charac^ter  and  feelings,  would  become  very  uncomfortable 
neighbours  to  the  United  Slates. 

Nova-Scotia  does  not  offer  a  more  tempting  prize. —  A  country, 
poor,  miferable,  producing  no  llaple  article,  ])()pulated  by  men,  em- 
bittered againil  us,  by  a  thoufand  recollections,  and  who,  probably, 
in  half  a  century,  will  not  have  forgotten  their  deep  rooted  preju- 
dices  againd  iis,  and  our  fyilem  of  governinent.  We  cannot,  more- 
over, retain  Halifax,  without  a  fuperior  naval  force. 

It  will  not  be  pretended  therefore,  that  our  exilling  w'llllary 
means,  directed  and  applied  by  our  pacifick  commander  in  cliief, 
ought  to  infpire  great  confidence  in  fnccefs. 

But  wx  may  be  told,  and  tve  are  gravely  told,  that  we  have  an 
iiiiiih/ij'  revenue.  Our  overflowing  treafury  appears  to  have  em- 
barraflcd  our  government  to  find  means  to  employ  it.  As  rctifoit 
is  Mr.  Jeflerfon's  only  iviapun  in  his  exilling  contells  with  (Ireat- 
iMitain  and  Spain,  and  as  that  colts  no  more  than  Mr.  Madifon's 
fii!<iry  and  ilcrL  hire,  he  never  dreamed  that  it  was  poifible  that  his 
redf'iii  might  j)erchance  fail  of  producing  its  effeCt,  and  that  we 
iliould  have  occafion  for  the  ultima  rati'j  regum,  p'tivikr  dtul  halls. 

It  is  poffible  that  fome  weak  minds  may  really  believe  that  our 
revenue  is  a  war  re/ouree,  and  that  it  jullifies  our  holding  a  bullying 
language  to  Great-Britain.  For  the  information  of  fuch  men.  wc 
iiiall  Hate  tlii;  j)oii)t  briefly.  C^ur  revenue  in  time  of  peace,  is  lO 
niill'ons  of  dollars,  of  which  nine  tenths  are  derived  from  impolls 
on   mercliandi/e.     This  revenue,    if  it   eotiU  continue,   is  but   on'. 


fevel 

wlul 

pleJ 

do,  I 

rer 

thnl 

wcl 

mitl 

rd,| 


\ 


V  — 


'M 


I'evcntccnth  part  of  that  of  our  propofed  enemy,  and  would  bo 
wholly  inadequate  to  war  operatioi's.  Four  millions  of  it  are 
pledged  to  pay  the  interi  l  of  the  national  debt,  which  if  we  fail  to 
do,  not  a  cent  will  ever  be  obtained  by  loans  or  otherwife.  The 
remaining  fix  millions,  would  defray  the  cxpences  of  a  war  about 
ihref  months  annually.  For  the  remaining  nine  months,  each  year, 
we  mull;  feek  other  means,  ami  incur  a  new  debt.  But  as  it  is  ad- 
mitted by  Mr.  JefTerfon's  paper,  that  our  commerce  will  be  deitroy- 
ed,  our  revenue  founded  folely  on  that  commerce,  wWXfall  ivithit. 

Two  refources  which  our  preient  rulers  have  rendered  as  unpop- 
ular as  their  talents  would  permit,  mull  then  be  refortcd  to — loans 
and  taxes. 

Pall  experience  has  rendered  the  monied  interell  too  wife,  to  ad- 
vance their  money  without  tW  pledt^c  of  new  taxes  ;  and  even  with 
fuch  a  pledge,  an  adminiltration  which  has  avowed  its  hollility  to 
publick  faith,  and  the  individuals  of  which  openly  propofed  to  cheat 
the  publick  creditors,  before  they  came  into  power,  can  with  a  very 
ill  grace  propofe  to  bonow,  or  expe<il  to  be  believed,  when  they 
promlfe  to  pay. 

But  grant  that  loans  are  obtained,  iviul  that  the  war  is  carried  on 
with  fpirit  ;  taxes  mull  be  raifed  to  pay  the  interell  of  thelo  new 
loans.  The  odious  fyllem  of  e^icife  mull  be  revived,  and  the  ad- 
miniilration  muil  be  compelled  to  acknowledge  by  their  condiK'l, 
the  wife  forefight  of  their  predeceflors.  But  as  an  excife  of  double 
the  former  amount,  would  only  produce  as  much  as  the  former, 
owing  to  the  diminution  of  confumption  produced  by  the  dillrefl'es 
of  war,  this  fource  of  revenue  will  (,iily  produce  7-'>0,0()()  dollars 
per  annum.  We  mull  then  calculate  upon  about  '2(),()(K),()()0  dol- 
lars direft  taxes  annually,  on  land  and  Jlavcs.  In  laying  this  tax, 
Mr.  .leflerfon  will  have  occafion  for  all  his  10(),0()0  militia  and 
volunteers  ;  and  if  we  chouglu  him  as  much  of  a  llatefman,  as  his 
friends  pretend  to  do,  we  Ihould  have  fuppofed  that  this  was  the 
motive  for  raifing  tiiem.  To  bring  this  part  of  the  happy  effetls 
of  a  war  for  lirilijlj  defrters,  home  to  the  bofoms  of  the  fa.mers  of 
MafTachufetts,  this  llate's  proportion  of  t!ie  ai\nual  war  taxes  to  be 
livied  on  lands,  would  be  aboMt  two  millions  of  dollars  per  annum, 
or  about  fixteen  times  the  amoinit  of  our  prefenty/o-'f  tax,  and  about 


/> 


,  :H«w'W<«tt\iMUS»l«oi*».. 


I 


'I 


32 


double  that  of  our  whole  Hate  debt  ;  and  if  tlic  war  lliould  laft  five 
years,  and  there  "s  no  prufpcdt  of  a  fhorter  iflue,  we  fliould  have 
paid,  if  we  fliould  be  able,  10  millions  of  dollars,  or  a  fum  equal  to 
eighty  years  prcfent  taxes. — Nor  is  this  the  word  fide  of  the  pic- 
ture ; — as  the  New-England  farmers  are  in  the  habit  of  paying 
what  they  owe,  as  long  as  they  have  any  thinir  to  pay  with,  and  as 
the  citizens  of  fame  other  ftates  do  not  pay  till  they  are  compelled,  it 
would  refult,  that  the  chief  burden  of  the  war  would,  as  before,  fall 
upon  us  ; — heavy  balances  of  debts  would  be  accumulated  againft 
the  fouthem  ftates,  and,  after  the  peace,  we  fliould  have  another 
ci&  of  Congrefs  to  wipe  off  thcfe  balances,  as  was  urged  with  re- 
gard to  thofe  contrafted  during  the  revolutionary  war.* 

Thus  then  we  fee  what  fort  of  reliance  we  can  place  upon  the 
:\merican  army,  navy,  and  revenue,  in  an  offenfive  war  agaiiiR 
Great-Britain. 

But  we  are  told,  that  we  can  make  a  predatory  war  upon  the 
Britifh  commerce,  and  our  adminiftration  gives  another  proof  of 
its  fpirit  and  ability,  by  propofing  to  repofe  the  conduA  of  the 
war  in  the  individual  cnterprizc  of  its  citizens. — This  is  precifely 
in  charafter  :  but  even  tlila  reliance,  feeble  and  humiliating  as  it  is, 
will  fail. — They  will  permit  the  people  of  Mafl\ichufitts,  to  be  as 
n;ood  judges  of  this  fubjeft,  as  any  in  the  United  States. 

Inllead  of  fitting  out  their  700  dull  failing  merchantmen  af  pri* 
vatccrs,  their  paft  experience  teaches  them,  thai  with  every  advan- 
tage that   fyftem  cannot  be  purfued.f     Great-Britain  towards  the 

•  South-Carolina  is  faid  to  be  juft  collc(5ling;  the  tax  laid  in  179S,  and  which 
-le  paid,  nearly  fevcn  years  fince  ;  and  as  flic  pays,  I  prefume,  no  intercft  for 
ihis  delay,  it  has  been  at  our  expenfe. — She  has  favcd  50,000  dollars  by  tlii^ 
jilan,i)ut  of  the  ftates  who  paid  with  puni'l:uality. 

f  Tlie  opinions  here  exprefled  arc  pcrfeifVly  conformable  to  thofe  of  oiii 
beloved  Wafliiiipton  in  a  cafe  fimilar  but  Ids  ftronf^.  Thefe  opinions  may 
l)e  let'ii  in  a  letter  addrefTed  from  the  r.xecutive  department  to  Mr.  Mon- 
ri)e,  duted  Sept.  1-',   1795 — of  which  the  followinjj  is  an  extratl" 

"  How  prcpofterous  is  that  policy  which  reipiires  ns  to  abandon  and 
(leflroy  the  very  oljeB,  for  the  prrfervalion  of  which  hofblities  are  to  be 
loiiimenced  !  It  may  not  be  amifs,"  he  adds,  "  to  enlarge  on  the  confc- 
<iucnct's  of  our  enjraying;  in  the  war  ijrainft  Great-Britain. 

"  I.  Seeinj);  llic  has  the  command  of  the  fea  (and  appearances  indicalf  firong- 
ly  that  (lie  will  maintain  that  command,)  o\ir  commerce  mijrht  in  one  yeai- 
be  .innihilated,  and  thoufands  of  our  feamen  be  fl\ut  up  or  dyinfr  in  jails 
and  |)rilon  Ihips.  In  additi(m  to  h<r  fleets  now  in  comniiflion,  privateers 
would  fwarm,  as  loon  as  objedls  fo  ullaring  niiil  fo  nffailjU^  Wi  American 
' "Minurri'   fluuikl  prelent. 


.rvy^^'mi^mtv^m^hi*-- 


Mon- 


cloftf  of  the  lafl;  war,  had  learned  the  fecret  of  paralyzing  tlii 
fpecics  of  hoilility.  Can  it  then  be  expcfted,  that  with  no  enemy 
t)n  the  ocean,  and  with  double  the  number  of  (liips  of  war,  (lie  will 
lit  ilill,  and  permit  us  peaceably  to  rob  her  citizens  ?  Evciy  naval 
officer,  and  every  merchant  knows,  however  ignorant  they  may  be 
at  Wafliington,  that  fifty  fail  faiUng  frigates  would  as  completely 
blockade  our  ports,  and  fecure  our  privateers  from  the  power  of 
doing  injury,  as  if  they  were  under  lock  and  key,  or  hauled  up  a  la 
Jefferfon,  in  the  dry  docks  of  the  Potomac. 

We  proceed  then  to  coiiilder  the  otlu-r  branch  of  our  means  of 
annoyance,  which  may  be  called  commercial  warfare. — It  is  main- 
tained, that  we  can  by  a  war  bring  Great-Britain  to  an  acknowl- 
edgment of  our  claims  ;  by  coniifcatiug  the  debts  due  to  he. 
merchants  ;  by  ruining  her  manufadurers  ;  by  refufing  to  be 
doathed  ;  and  by  itarving  her  Well-India  colonies.  Although  it 
would  be  eafy  to  fliew,  that  all  thefe  meafures  would  eventually 
produce  more  dillrcfs  to  the  United  States  than  to  Great-Britain, 
tliat  in  all  cafes  of  this  nature,  the  dependance  is  mutual,  and  that 
in  fuch  conteils,  the  pnorefl  Hate  always  fuffers  the  moil  ;  yet  I 
Hiall  leave  this  point  to  tlie  good  fenfe  of  my  readers,  and  confidcr 
them  as  operating  only  on  Great- liritiiin. 

]'irll  then,  wc  are  to  carry  on  tiie  war,  and  to  diftrefs  our  enemy 

"  It  \sv  look  l);ick  to  thi'  tuo  laft  yi'.ir-.  of  our  revoliitioii:irv  war,  .' 
liulfjnu'nt  may  l)i'  fornu'il  on  this  point.  A  (Irikinjf  ilct'ci;^  in  her  naval 
.irr.ni;^i'nii'nts  in  prccitlin;^  vc.irs,  k'tt  our  port^  open  tor  the  entry  of  coni- 
luer.c,  for  tlie  eiiiiipinent  of  privatecr>,  antl  the  introduction  of  prizes.  A 
different  arrangement  in  the  latter  part  of  the  war,  totallv  clianged  the 
feene.  The  Iniall  privateers  were  hauled  up  as  inial)le  to  cope  with  arm- 
ed nierehantnien,  and  the  lar;;er  jirivateers  were  taken.  Our  lliippin.;  fell 
.It   the  fame  time  a  faeritice  to  the  vioil.uit  operations  of  the  Rritifli   navy. 

"  At  tlie  |)refent  moment  (17ii,'))  her  naval  power  is  ext:;nded  tieyond  a!! 
former  examples  ;  wiiile  that  nf  her  aumi.s  is  at   leart  not  incn.if.l. 

"  'Jdly.  Our  landed  as  well  as  commereial  interelts  would  fuiler  heyoud  al! 
ealeidation.  Agriculture  above  the  fupjiiv  of  our  own  wants,  would  be  luf- 
peniled,  or  its  pnilmr  furlih  un  cur  Iijil.'j.  The  value  of  our  lands  anil  ev- 
.  ry  fpeeies  of  tlomeUick  pro|i,rty  woidd  link. 

"  lldly.  The  fourcesof  reveinie  f.iiliiijr,  |)ulilick  credit  would  be  dtilroyed, 
.Old  multitudes  <if  citizens  involved  in  ruin.  The  /:,ifL'  at  l.in^c  would  hi- 
(ilunjijed  from  the  fuinniit  of  profperity  into  an  abyl's  of  ruin,  ti'o  liulden 
and  too  levere  to  be  p.itieiitly  borne.  To  incre.ife  their  calamities,  Mn\: 
■  axf!  must  be  levied  to  I'upport  the  war  ;  and  it  would  be  happy  for  \i, 
■' \\v  could  coiDlenipl.iic  onlv    /■/..■•■■i  \\  :ir.  !n  wli-oU  ,,■//»•>/♦  in.'i,:" 


J 


nmmnt^ummf-i^-  -:„..^-^„ 


'i 


'M- 


by  reforting  to  llic  olil  ililgraicfiil  lyilvni  ot  coiilifiatioii.  If  thif 
profligacy  and  infamy  of  fiicli  propolitions  have  tifj  weight  in  the 
i-lUmation  of  our  fellow  citi/rns,  (which  I  will  not  bi-lievc)  they 
will  furily  lilU-u  to  the  maxima  of  expL-riL-nco,  a  dear  bought  i-xpe- 
rienci',  and  an  enlightened  policy.  How  trifling  a  fum  it  produced 
to  the  nation  in  the  lall  war,  every  publick  man  knows. — Its  only 
tendency  was  to  fcrcen  a  few  fraudulent  debtors,  who  rejoicing  in 
an  opportunity  to  defraud  their  hotujl  f;-«/;7o>/,  could  of  courfe, 
think  it  no  robbery  to  defraud  the  publick.  Nothing  came  into 
tlie  publick  elicit,  and  even  the  joy  of  the  fraudulent  debtor  was 
extremely  Jhirt  itvtJ.  At  the  treaty  of  peace,  Great-Britain,  as 
nuill  always  be  the  cafe,  infilled  as  a  fine  qua  non,  upon  the  rellor- 
atio.i  of  the  rights  of  her  bona  fide  fubjefts. — The  courts  were 
opened  to  the  Britilh  creditors,  and  the  debtors  were  compelled  to 
pay  with  accumulated  intereft  : — nor  was  this  the  nvorjl  part  of  it  ; 
the  Virginia  legiilature  refufed  to  obey  the  publick  authority  ;  it 
negledted  to  open  its  courts  ;  tiieir  eiti/ens  who  owed  the  Britifh 
merchants,  availed  tliemfelves  of  tiiis  fufpenfion  of  right,  of  this 
//,//."  rehi-U'ion  againll  the  treaty,  and  became  bankrupt.  Great- 
Britain  infilled  on  redrefs,  for  this  violation  of  the  treaty,  and  Mr. 
Jefierfon  ratified  a  convention  on  this  fubject,  and  has  paid  to 
Great- Britain  three  million^  of  dollars,  on  account  of  thefe  fufpend- 
ed  debts. 

Is  our  pad  experience  tjieii  favourable  to  a  repetition  of  tlii.'. 
fyllem  of  iniquity  ?  But  nations  ought  to  be  governed  by  more 
exteniive  policy  ; — meafures  ought  never  to  be  rcforted  to,  the 
tendency  of  which,  is  to  debafe  the  morals  of  the  people,  and  to 
link  the  national  charaftcr. 

If  we  go  to  tiHir  with  Great-Britain,  it  will  not  be  eternal  ; — 
peace  mull  fooncr  or  later  arrive  :  our  intcrells,  the  great  and  ef- 
fential  interefls  of  our  country,  require  that  Europe  fiiould  be  cur 
work  fliop  :— fo  fays  Mr.  Jefferfon  ;  fo  all  fenfible  men  admit. 
Great-Britain  is  the  cheapeft  labourer  ;  her  manufafturcs  are  fuited 
to  our  Iiahits,  and  our  neceffities.  But  neither  Great-Britain,  nor 
any  other  nation  with  whom  we  may  by  poflibility  be  embroiled,  will 
ever  trull  us,  if  we  pafs  confifeation  laws,  without  adding  to  the  price; 
ot  the  goods  a  premium  for  the  rifl<;  of  a  fraudulent  confdcation  ; 


,  .?»rt!*S«#8t^;.WJ.-««<'^ 


\ 


and  as  all  fuch  rifl<8  arc  over  clliinatcd,  we  iliall  probably  pay  tea 
times  over,  for  the  jjaltry  and  wicked  fatisfac^tioii  of  robbing  her 
private  citizens,  who  have  tnifted  their  property  to  ours. 

Such  were  the  enlightened  views  of  Mr.  Jay  and  Prefident 
Wafhington,  and  few  men  had  better  opportunities  of  judging  of 
the  effects  of  confifcation.  Mr.  Jay  was  dinfted,  and  did  accord- 
ingly agree  to  an  article,  which  is  a  permanent  one,  and  Hill  in 
force,  ftipulating,  *'  that  in  all  future  wars  between  us  and  Clreat- 
Britain,  no  confifcation  of  private  debts  fliould  be  made." — Can 
it  then  be  contended,  that  in  the  only  cafe  in  which  the  article  was 
to  operate,  it  becomes  void  ?  And  will  it  be  pretended  that  nations 
can  make  no  regulations  to  foften  the  rigors,  and  lefl'cn  the  calam- 
ities of  war  ? 

Without  fuch  an  article,  Great-Britain  never  would  make  peace 
with  any  nation  whom  flie  fupplies,  without  ftipulating  for  the 
payment  of  debts  due  to  her  citizens,  and  with  fuch  an  article  in  her 
hand,  what  could  any  honell  American  commiflloners  for  making 
peace,  fay  to  her  negotiators  ?  The  man  mull  be  hardened  indeed, 
who  will  contend,  tliat  we  ought  to  exercife  a  power,  malum  iu  fe, 
debafing,  corrupting,  difgraceful,  and  iu  face  of  a  pofitive,  humane, 
and  honourable  ilipulation. 

But  fecondly,  we  are  to  ruin  the  manufatlurers  of  Great-Britain, 
at  the  very  profpeft  of  a  war  they  were  to  rife  in  rebellion  ;  the 
prophecy  on  tliis  fubjeft,  has  turned  out  already  to  be  partially  falfc. 

Inllead  of  that  terror,  that  violent  oppofition  to  war  from  the 
manufacturers,  we  hear  of  no  dillurbance,  and  very  little  uneafinefs. 
The  great  manufaduring  towns  in  England,  have  taken  no  ileps  to 
prevent  a  war  or  to  cxprefs  their  anxiety  about  it  ;  on  the  con- 
trary, we  learn  from  peifons  who  have  arrived  from  England,  that 
a  war  with  us  is  at  Icajl  nut  unpopular,  and  efpecially  in  Birming- 
ham, which  is  the  greateft  tvork  Jhop  for  thi-  country.  I  might 
reft  the  argument  here,  for  it  will  be  admitted,  that  no  people  are 
better  judges  of  their  intereft,  than  the  manufacturers  of  England  ; 
and  if  a  war  would  be  fo  ruinous  to  them,  they  certainly  would 
not  be  quiet  as  we  Lnoiv  they  were,  though  a  war  was  expcAed. 

But  I  will  give  a  very  brief  fummary,  to  ftiew  that  a  war  would 
not  be  very  injurious  to  thefe  manufacturers. 


M 


;**,,T«ii«*l^K«W»... 


> 


It. 


I  ', 


J 


i^ 


111.  Their  articles  aiv  many  of  them  of  the  firft  noceffity,  and 
nations  ;it  war  with  thrm,  mull  and  will  get  thcin,  in  fpite  of  pro- 
hibitory ri'j^ulations.  Woiiapartc  has  exerted  </// /w />o<ri«r  for  fivo 
ycarH,  to  Ihnt  out  their  niainifai^tures,  and  yet  his  own  army,  and 
even  court,  arc  openly  clothed  in  them.  If  700,000  troops  can- 
not riiut  them  out  of  France,  will  patriotifm  without  a  fword,  ef- 
I'x^t  it  in  America  •.  Patriotifm  did  not  prevent  hundreds  of  our 
louMtrymcn  from  fitting  out  privateers  and  taking  our  own  velfels  ; 
many  have  grown  rich  by  plunder  of  this  fort.  Patriotifm  does 
iK)t  prevent  the  flave  trade,  though  the  laws  are  fo  fcverely  pro- 
hibitory. Tn  fliort,  pnlr'iotifm  cannot  be  calcdatcd  upon,  to  cfTecl 
that  ivhich  poirer  finds  it  vain  to  attempt. 

2dly.  A  much  finaller  proportion  of  the  population  of  tli(  unit- 
ed kingdoms  of  Great-Britain  and  Ireland,  are  employed  in  manii- 
fadluring  for  \\:,  than  we  have  ufually  thought. — Not  more  than 
one  fixth  part  of  the  population  of  Great-Britain,  is  employed  in 
any  manufiUhires.  Four  fifths  at  leaft  of  the  manufactures  of  all 
nations,  are  confumed  at  home.  Great-Britain  exports  only  about 
fix  millions  worth  annually,  to  America,  and  it  is  only  the  profits 
on  this  capital,  wliicU  (he  would  lofe,  which  would  not  exceed  one 
million. — She  miglit  not  even  lofe  that  ; — the  capital  which  is  iiov/ 
employed  in  manufacttiring  foi  us,  may  be  withdrawn  from  manu- 
fafturcs,  and  employed  in  agriculture  and  commerce,  and  it  would 
only  be  the  diflcrence  of  profit  between  the  new  employ,  and  the 
(lid,  \v;;ich  flic  would  lofe.  Fuit  grant  that  flie  fliould  lofe  one  mil- 
lion per  annum — wil'i  that  materially  adect  the  policy  of  a  nation 
v.liofe  revenue  is  10  millions  :  Is  Great-Britain  to  be  ruined  by  an 
addition.ll  iv.'.'.Iion  \  If  that  be  the  cafe,  to  borrow  a  phrafe  from  :» 
writer  of  our  (iwn,  "  We  have  only  to  gather  up  our  garments  and 
fall  with  dvcciicy."  If  Great-Britain  be  fo  reduced  as  to  be  ruin- 
<  d  by  one  million  more,  Jhe  miijl  folly  and  how  long  our  rights  and 
liberties,  and  the  I'tkity  of  the  feas  will  furvive  her,  I  fliall  endeav  ■ 
our  to  ihcw  briefly  in  the  conclufion  of  this  (Icetch. 

Bill  lailly,  we  are  to  ibu-ve  her  Well-India  colonics. — It  is  real- 
ly afVor.illiing,  lliat  men  will  be  fo  blinded  by  their  hatred  to  Great- 


Brit; 
a -I. 


\\\. 


as   to   urre  and   appear  to  b<'lieve   fuch  abfurd  notions 


d  tl 


i'"v    not 


a 


irve   ctur 


ing 


tl-, 


e  revolutionary  war 


N 


ova- 


-^ 


V 


vi 


37 


Scotia  then  fupplicd  tlicm  witli  little  ov  iiotliiiij{  ;  lia'  *  an  i  ow 
fupply  them  with  nearly  all  they  want.  They  do  not  take  our 
!)ecf  and  pork  in  peace,  tliey  are  fo  dainty  ;  and  y»t  we  talk  of 
Uarving  them  !  lint  if  they  could  fupport  a  war  of  eight  years, 
when  Nova-Hcoiia  was  a  young,  uncultivated  country,  when  our 
privateers  fwarmeii  in  thefc  feaa,  and  the  ocean  wa;  covered  with 
the  fleets  of  France,  Spain,  and  Holland,  how  mueli  eafier  will  it 
be  to  fullain  a  war,  when  tin-  provifion  vefTels  of  England,  can 
navigate  in  perfecl  fafely,  having  no  one  to  make  them  afraid  ? 
But  do  wc  not  view  the  other  fide  of  the  pirture  J  PoirefTed  a» 
they  will  be  of  Buenos  Ayns,  where  provilions  are  cheaper  than 
in  any  part  of  the  world,  is  there  not  danger,  that  a  war  with  us 
may  turn  their  attention  to  other  c'lannels  of  fupply,  and  thus 
dellroy,  perhaps  for  ever  this  branch  of  our  commerce  i 

It  will  be  feen  then,  that  the  hope  of  coercing  Great-Britain  by 
commercial  warfare,  is  as  delulivc  and  defperate,  as  by  arms  ; — and 
after  a  long,  but  bloodlefs  war,  in  which  we  fliould  be  called  upon 
to  fuffer  rather  than  aft,  we  fiiould  probably  be  obliged  to  aban- 
don the  claims  for  which  the  war  was  undertaken,  unlefs  Great- 
Britain,  from  caufes  totally  out  of  i,ur  lonlnJ,  fliould  be  obliged  to 
yield  to  the  reliftlcfs  j)ower  ot  France. 

Let  us  now  take  a  brief  view  of  the  efTedts  of  a  Britifli  war,  up- 
on  ourfelvcs. — Thofe,  who  deluded  by  the  language  of  tiie  ivar 
newfpapers,  and  cfpecially  Mr.  .leflerftin's,  believi,  tiiat  we  are  to 
enter  imo  a  war  in  whie!i  Great-Britain  wid  be  the  only  fuffercr ; 
and  that  we  fliall  continue  to  profper  as  before,  will  be  woefully 
deceived.  Not  a  man  who  has  any  thing  to  lofe,  not  a  labourer, 
wiio  depends  on  the  fweat  of  iiis  (now,  but  will  feel,  and  rue  the 
eflecls  of  fuch  a  war  : — tliey  will  be  almoll  eciually  felt,  and  per- 
ceived in  the  compting-houfes  of  tlie  merchants  ;  the  parlours  of 
the  rich  ;  and  the  cottage  of  the  poor. 

The  farmer  will  furrender  his  cattle  to  the  tax  gatherer  ;  the 
mechanick  will  be  obliged  to  hang  up  his  rully  too^s  ;  and  the 
children  of  our  indullrious  fifliermcn,  will  demand  their  bread  in 
vain.  This  is  not  the  pictu'v  of  a  fourth  of  July  orator — it  is 
fober  reality.  The  National  Intelligencer  with  the  fang  froid  of 
a  true  philofophcr,  configns  to  beggary  'Jjl),00()  merchants.     I  Ic 


i\ 


■^ 


_  i.«-**>*>*i'^es 


/,« 


38 


la 


t 


J 


admits  "  that  commerce  will  be  dcdroyed  by  a  war,  and  in  its 
fall  will  criiflt  its  immediate  dependents  ;"  but  he  infults  the  un- 
derilandings  of  us  New-England  farmers,  by  iniinuatingthat  all  tl  e 
other  clafl'cs  of  fociety  will  efcape  its  effefts.  Wlio  are  to  employ 
and  give  bread  to  the  MOOjOOO  mechanicks  in  our  fcaport  towns, 
after  tlie  merchants  are  beggared  ?  Who  arc  to  pav  the  banks 
when  all  the  property  of  their  debtors  is  annihilated  by  war  ? 
When  the  banks  ilop  their  dividends,  and  lofe  part  of  their  capitals, 
what  will  become  of  the  widows  and  orphans  who  have  depofited 
their  little  modicum  in  thefe  publick  inltitutions  ?  When  the  fmall 
country  banks  fail,  who  will  indemnify  the  farmers  who  hold  their 
bills  ? 

What  will  become  of  the  country  traders,  and  tlie  farmers,  who 
owe  them,  wlien  the  creditors  of  the  beggared  merchants  call  upon 
them  for  immediate  payment  ? 

It  is  admitted,  by  the  advocates  of  war,  that  commerce  will  l)e 
wholly  annihilated  ;  with  ll.uit  falls  our  revenue  : — the  colleftion 
of  direft  taxes  will  be  found  fo  flow,  and  fo  unpopular,  and  th."' 
calls  on  government  will  be  fo  much  more  prejj'mg  than  thofe  of  the 
publick  creditors,  that  the  intcrcll  of  the  national  debt  will  be  fuf- 
pended.  Tiie  party  in  power,  have  always  been  oppofed  to  this 
clafs  of  publick  creditors,  and  tiiough  they  have  as  yet  paid  puniiii- 
tillyt  and  have  not  violated  the  contrad,  it  is  only  becaufe  they 
have  had  ample  means,  and  it.was  a  convenient  engine  of  power  ; — 
It  was  a  (Irong  hold  over  their  political  enemies. — But  create  more 
prefllng  exigencies,  and  thoufands  of  honeft  creditors  will  be  K-ft 
to  llarve. — This  is  what  they  formerly  propofed — it  would  gratify 
mrim  fecret  wifhes. 

If  a  war,  then,  will  annihilate  coinmerce,  as  the  National  Intelli- 
genci-r  admits,  will  ruin  2.)(),00()  merchants,  beggar  all  the  me- 
chanicks immediately  dependant  on  the  merchants,  injure  fome,  and 
produce  the  failure  of  many  of  the  banking  inftitutions — if  it  will 
deftroy  our  revenue,  and  oblige  the  government  to  fufpend  the  pay- 
ment of  the  intereil  of  the  national  debt — if,  moreover,  as  a  neccf- 
(aiy  confequence,  it  will  cripple,  if  not  bankrupt  our  infiirance 
companies,  can  \.W  farmers  hope  to  efcape  the  general  devallation  ? 

Are  there  none  alive  who  recoiled  the  effctts  of  our  revolution- 


\ 


h 


39 


ary  war  ?  Can  agriculture  flourifli,  when  there  arc  no  buyers  ? 
When  all  the  other  orders  of  focicty  are  ruined,  the  taxes  mull  fall 
upon  the  land-holders — and  we  have  (hewn,  that  the  revenue  from 
import  failing,  the  farmers  will  be  called  upon  to  defray  the  whole 
expcnfes  of  the  war,  which  will  annually  amount  to  about  fixtcoii 
times  the  fum  of  our  prcfent  State  tax. 

Can  any  agricultural  profits  meet  thcfe  exigencies  ?  When  our 
children  are  called  off  from  the  labours  of  the  plough,  to  tliofe  of 
war,  can  we  fupport  our  families,  and  pay  tlie  extraordinary  demands 
of  government  ?  Let  thofe  who  view  thefe  as  light  and  tolerable 
evils,  be  clamorous  for  war  ;  but  for  mv  part,  I  prefer  to  renounce 
the  right  of  proteAing  and  enlifting  the  fubjefts  of  foreign  nations, 
when  our  own  population  furniflies  men  lufiicient  for  our  commerce 
and  our  navy,  to  embarking  in  a  doubtful  contelt,  ruinous  in  its  ef- 
fefts,  and  uncertain  as  to  its  iffue. 

I  have  faid  that  tlie  war,  which  we  are  called  upon  to  wage, 
would  be  a  war  without  hope.  I  liave  endeavoured  to  lliew  that  we 
can  place  no  reafonable  reliance  on  our  own  refources  in  an  offenfive 
and  extraneous  war  againil  Great-Britain  :  but  I  Ihall  l)e  told,  that 
we  may  calculate  upon  tl>e  aid  of  France,  Spain,  Holland,  and 
Ruflia.  Indeed,  we  have  been  alnady  told,  that  Inch  an  alliance 
would  fecure  us  fuccefs.*  Without  entering  into  the  impolicy  of 
thus  embarking  in  the  wide  field  of  European  politicks,  let  us  ad- 
mit tha.  we  do  fo  embark,  and  that  the  utmoll  fuccefs  crowns  our 
efforts — let  us  fuppof>'  our  enemy.  Great- Britain,  prollrate  at  the 
feet  of  the  allied  powers — would  our  filuation  be  ameliorated  ? 
Sliould  ive  be  conlidered  as  principals,  or,  like  the  other  allies,  as 
humble  vaffals  in  the  train  of  the  vidor  ?  Rome  too  had  her  allies, 
but  was  their  fitiiation  lefs  dependant  tlian  thofe  of  tlie  vanqui(hed  ? 


•  VVi'  iilrc.iily  piTci'ivf,  l)y  the  riiiijoinod  acccniiit  of  tlic  celebration  of  tlio 
late  I'lcnrli  victories  in  (i('ort;ia,  that  lome  oi  our  ciii/cns  iiave  already  con- 
iK'ck'd  our  (Icftiiiics  with  ll>.oit'  of  Iranco.  Tiiis  article  n  C(ii)icd  from  the 
Palladiiiin,  of  OOl.  '_'. — "  .S,i\annah,  Sept.  1'..'.  On  Saturday,  the  I'.'th  inftant.a 
numerous  company  of  republicans  allondiied  at  the  lilature,  to  celebrate  the 
vii'lories  of  the  I  rcnch  iialivm  ovit  the  allies  of  I'lifjjiaiid — events  leading  to  the 
peace  and  profperity  of  tlicfe  U.  States — the  I  h'n.  Itlward  Telfair,  I'reliileiit, 
William  Stephens,  and  I'cter  H.  Morel,  lUifrs.  Vice-1'retidents." — Are  we  neu- 
tral ?  Are  Kullia  ,irid  Prulli  j  our  friends  '  Is  it  ufual  to  rejoice  over  the  de- 
I'ruclion  uf  oni'b  friends  ' 


■\ 


I 


l> 


40 


/i 


'P 


Giaiil  all  that  is  uJfunhJ,  tliat  Britain  is  the  tyrant  of  the  ocean — 
will  the  man  who  fubjiigatcd  tiie  bravo  and  inoilViuling  vSwifs,  who 
annihilated  the  ropiiblick  of  Italy,  to  place  a  diadem  on  his  own 
lirow,  who  compelled  the  Ihibboni  Dutchman,  our  friend  and  ally,* 
to  receive  a  mailer,  after  100  years  of  unexampled  refillancc 
to  oppreflion — who  has  left  not  one  fined  of  liberty  or  independ- 
ence, through  the  vaft,  populous,  and  powerful  regions,  over  which 
his  viftorious  arms  have  extended,  be  delicately  or  fcrupuloufly  re- 
gardful of  the  maritime  rights  of  nations  ? 

Having  conquered  the  contiiicnt  of  Europe,  he  exclaimed,  "  all 
I  want  are  lommcin,  roloiiics  andjh'ips.'^  Can  any  virtuous  and  hi<';li- 
minded  freeman  of  our  country  believe,  that  in  procuring  the  grat- 
ification of  f/<-ff  wants,  he  will  be  more  ferupulous  or  tender  of  the 
rights  of  ol/.ur  nation'^,  than  he  has  been  in  attaining  the  vail  and 
immeafurabl"  power  whieh  he  now  poded'es  i" 

It  may  perhaps  be  thought  by  /'•/iiic,  that  1  have  been  too  fru-  in 
my  cenlurcs  of  the  piefent  adminillration,  that  1  have  intimated 
that  they  li;ive  rather  courted,  than  fought  to  avoid,  the  prefent 
Hate  of  miliiiidei  Handing  between  us  and  Great-liritain.  I  con- 
fels  that  il  Inch  fhould  be  the  inference,  it  would  not  be  an  unfaii 
one.  1  h;ur  always  been  apprebenliv,-,  that  the  marked  partiality 
or  di'-ad  of  I'lance,  and  the  deep-rooted  hollility  to  Great-Britain, 
which  th'y  h  ivr  iiivariahly  difcovercd,  would  lead  to  unplealanl 
coiife(|neiieis.  It  is  will  known,  to  all  men  wlio  have  noticed  the 
rourfe  of  our  political  liillory,  that  the  perfons  now  adminiilering 
the  government  of  the  I'r.ited  States,  have  avowed,  both  before 
and  fince  they  came  into  power,  a  fettled  oppofition  to  Great- 
Jlrit.un. 


,! 


M 


•  I  Ii'll.ui,!  li:m  ln'cii  one  i.f  our  t'nftcft,  llrmclt  1;  1l:u!5 — flu'  took  in  c.nh  itml 
.III  lioiu'lt  part  ill  t.ivour  olDur  lil)(.'r;il■^.  Hfi  aiil  wa-.  not,  as  tlu-  I'rt'iu-Ii  (lirei- 
Iiirv  fay  theirs  vva.,,  tlu'Mruit  of  a  \):\U-  Ipeculation."  'I'lii'  Duleh  love  irofdoiti 
---irvfuty  years  war  lor  the  attainment  of  it.  liad  cniU'ar  •(!  it  to  tlicin.  U'.'ii. 
wiMiliI  liavi'  iniaj^iiu'il  that  our  prtfcit  .iilniiiiilijation  vsouM  liavi'  'oien  l!i  ■  liili 
to  nihilt  a  nation,  to  whom  \\c  \\i.ri'  liouiul  liv  i\>  nianv  tie*  ol  j;r,i(iui(ii.',  liv 
Millar,  ■,t,||,,iii,,r  thtir  ii|)(tart  tyrant  on  his  accilliop.  to  the  throne  .'  U  iio  woulil 
have  thoiif'ht  that  our  ripnhhcan  I'.LlitlL'n:  would  liavi' hei'ii  io  c-ih.t  to  ad- 
drcU  his  "  dearly  Iniived  hioli.er  of  i  loll:uul '"  Wlial  would  have  been 
faid  ()1  Walliinylon,  if  ho  /.,;,/liuis  pi;t  the  feal  to  tyranny,  efjieiialiy  w 'len 
havin,'^  noMiinilhr  at  that  I'oiirt,  JurcconId  Lc  lo  luceHitv'of  l.iyiligany  thinj; 
on  ihc  hihi.ct  '    Sed  tenip.ir.i  nnil  iiiti:;  it  iios  inmatniir  aim  iili. ' 


try 

1i(h 

that 

bly 

witlj 

mv 


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+1 


it  is  of  no  moment  to  confider  the  private  motives  which  liave 
led  to  this  undue  prejudice.  It  is  fufficient  to  fay  that  the  faft 
cxills,  and  is  avowed  and  juilified  in  Mr.  JefFerfon's  paper,  the  Na- 
tional InteUigencer. 

They  even  declare  that  we  ought  to  go  back  to  the  events  of  the 
revolutionary  war,  to  (harpen  our  refentments  againll  Great-Britain. 

Whether  thefe  prejudices  had  any  (hare  in  inducing  tlie  PreGdent 
to  fend  back  the  treaty,  made  by  his  oivn  minifters  extraordinary, 
I  fhall  not  undertake  to  decide  ;  but  I  take  the  liberty  to  make 
on  this  topick  three  remarks. 

1  ft.  That  it  is  a  thing  unexampled  in  the  hiftory  of  nations,  to 
fend  back  a  treaty  made  by  authorized  agents,  unlcfs  they  were  ei- 
ther corrupt,  exceeded  their  authority,  or  compromifed  the  moft  cf- 
fential  intercfts  of  the  State,  in  either  of  which  cafes  the  miniilers 
ought  to  be  recalled. 

iJd,  That  it  is  unreafonable  to  expeft  in  a  pubUck  treaty  with 
another  nation,  that  every  article  (hould  be  in  our  ow.i  favour — 
fomething  mult  neceffarily  be  given  up  on  both  fides,  or  a  Itate  of 
holUlity  never  could  ceafc.  The  only  queilion  ought  to  be,  wheth- 
er  it  was  ;is  good,  as  under  all  the  circumllaiiccs  of  the  cafe,  we 
liad  a  right  to  oxpedt  ?  It  is  believed  that  this  treaty^  on  the  whole, 
was  fucli  a!i  one  as  the  ITiiited  States  ouglit  to  have  accepted. 

.'}d.  That  there  was  no  foundation  for  the  report,  that  there  was 
annexed  to  the  treaty  a  conJitinn  which  the  United  States  ouglit 
not  lo  have  acceded  to. 

It  may  perhaps  occur  to  fome  of  our  readers,  convinced  a»  they 
will  be  of  the  impolicy  of  enterii'g  into  a  war  with  Great-Britain, 
and  of  the  total  incompetency  of  our  means  lo  carry  on  fucli  a 
war,  to  afl{,  Is  it  good  policy  to  expofc  the  weaknefs  of  our  coun- 
try to  the  world  ?  Does  it  not  betray  a  want  of  patriotifm,  to  pub- 
lilh  our  opinion  of  our  oivn  mifconduiil,  and  to  endeavour  to  prove 
that  we  are  unable  to  cope  with  a  nation  with  wliom  we  may  pofli- 
bly  be  embroiled  ?  This  is  a  fpecies  of  popular  error,  too  common 
with  many  defcriptions  of  pcrfons  in  our  country. 

With  my  jullification  on  this  topick,  T  fhnll  clofe  t'l.is  aildrefs  u\ 
;ny  fellow-citi/eiis. 


42 


In  all  free  governments,  publick  opinion  muft  eventually  direft 
the  moft  important  meafures  of  tbc  adminiftration.  When  once  cx- 
preflcd  by  the  legal  *conJl'itute(l  authorities,  it  is  binding  vpon  all  the 
citizens,  though  it  'kJIHI  competent  for  them  to  ufe  the   prcfs,  in 


fi 


J 


'  We  fay,  that  when  expreffed  by  the  conpltnh- J  authorities,  this  pubh'ck  opin- 
ion oiijrht  to  be  treated  with  the  hi^trhe/l  n/fnii  ;  and  one  would  iiave  I'uppofed, 
that  in  a  country  like  ours,  which  boafts  of  its  li^ht  and  information,  a  con- 
trary opinion  could  not  prevail :  but  the  National  Inte.ligencer,  in  its  fcrious 
reafoniag,  confiders  the  expreflion  of  the  puhlick  opinion,  by  the  populace  in 
about  tivfht  mercantile  towns  as  bindinjj  on  all  the  dtizmt.  In  reply  to  fome 
reafonings,  endeavouring  to  fliew  that  war  would  not  be  juftifiable,  that  paper 
remarks,  tiiat  it  is  unneceflary  to  enter  into  tiie  difcullion  ot  the  juftice  of  a  war, 
"  the  people  have  decided  that  qucftion — they  have  •wiilfJ  it,  unlefs  ample  rep- 
aration be  made." 

'I'he  Clironicle  holds  the  fame  language 

Now  we  undertake  to  fay,  that  the  numbers  and  the  violence  difpliyed  on 
this  occalion,  were  lefs  than  thofe  which  appeared  in  oppofition  to  the  Britifli 
Creaty — every  one  of  the  fame  great  cities  was  in  nppofition  to  i/wi  inftru- 
i\UMU — but,  happily  for  our  country,  M'afliington  did  not  miftakc  the  clamours 
of  a  multitude  in  a  great  city,  which  fiijaMe  men  think  it  more  prudent  to  go 
\vith  than  to  nppofc,  in  the  tirft  paroxyfnis  of  iis  rage,  for  the  ti///  of  the  people, 
(iovcrnor  tiullivan  and  .SheritF  Allen  tried  at  that  time  the  ertetft  of  oppofi- 
lion,  and  they  had  very  convincing  proofs  of  the  wifdoni,  good  fenfe,  and  rea- 
rmaMenel's  (if  an  inluriated  jiopulace. 

It  is  ridiculous  to  call  the  proceedings  at  the  Statc-Houfe,  in  Bofton  the 
iLMife  ()''  the  inhabitants  of  Mairaciuifetts.  'I'hofe  of  us  who  were  near  enough 
to  Hoflon  to  lift  up  the  fpleiidid  veil  with  which  tlicfe  thing's  are  covered, 
know,  that  neither  that  meeting,  nor  the  one  ligned  by  William  Cooper,  were 
coiieifl  exprellions  of  the  publick  will. 

Tlie  hiftory  of  thefe  meetings  is  brief  y  this  : — The  cool  and  judicious  men  of 

both  parties  in   ljip(>"ri,  were  oiipofed  t.   having  any  meeting  on  the  fubject, 

and  o|)cnly  ex])rclk'(l  their  dif.ipprobalion  of  them.     Not  that  the  inhabitants 

of  this  iuetropoiii  are  ever  behind  their  lellow-citizcns  in  their  zeal  to  vindicate 

llie  rights,  and  maintain   the   honour  of  their  country — Init  they  thought  that 

we  were  too  ignorant  of  the  facfs,  and  too  \incertain  of  the  true  courfc  to  be 

(iiirfued,  to  venture  to   give  a  decideil  opinion   upon  the  lubjeift.     .Such  was 

the  temper  ol  the  inhabitant-.,  when  a  refpecl    for  the  citizens  of  Norfolk,  in. 

(luced  tiie  .Sdeclmcii  to  call  a  town-meeting.     At  this  meeting,  it  is  well  known 

that  lo  great  an  inicertainty  prevailed,  as  to  the  true  policy  to  be  adopted,  that 

the  it, habitants,  on  the  propolition  to  appoint  a  committee,  did   not  generally 

vote  on  either  lide,  and   the  refpeclable   Moderator,  thinking  that  the   luke- 

warmnefs  difcovered  was  not  lulTiclently  refpeCtful  for  the  occalion,  intimated 

the  propriety  of  more  a])pareiit  ze.d,  and  aO^ually  put  the  (]ueflion  a  fecond  time. 

This  ft,\te  of  tarts  i>  well  known,  and  the  F.ditor  of  the  Aurora,  at  I'hiladel- 

pliia.has  an  arch  allulicn  to  it,  when    he  obf  rved,  that   the  relbhitions  of  Bof- 

ton  were  force-meat.     The  Chronicle   rc|H'ated  this   wit    agamll  its  own  town, 

and  yet  has  the  elFrcmtery  to  cite  thefe  relbhitions,  as  exprelfive  of  the  publick: 

will.     It  maybe  laid,  that  this  goes  to  jirove  that  many  individuaN  acted  with 

infmcerity. 

I  alk,  how  |)eople  niufl  be  cxpedled  to  art  in  a  popular  government,  when 
the  palfions  are  fuddenly  and  violeiuly  inflamed  ?  To  foothe  aiu  perfuade, 
"r  oppiilc  and  inflante  .' 


43 


order  to  effeft  a  change  in  the  adminiftration,  or  a  repeal  of  the 
meafures. 

But  as  this  publick  opinion  may  be  dircfted  or  foreftalled  by 
artful  and  defigning  men,  or  may  be  mifdircfted  by  error  or  paflion, 
it  is  not  only  the  right,  but  the  duty  of  thofe  who  believe  that  fuch 
errors  exift,  to  endeavour  to  correft  them. 

When,  therefore,  a  party  of  men,   from   finifter  or  from  honejl 
motives,  mifreprefent  the  condudl  of  a   foreign  nation,   prefent  an 
unnatural  and  diftorted  view  of  fadls,  appeal  to  the  publick  paffions, 
attempt  to  filence  all  oppofition,  reprefent  our  abihty  to  wage  war 
in  a  moft  extravagant  light,  magnify  our  means  of  injuring  our  en- 
emy, and  diminifli  her  power  and  ability  to  injure  us,  and  efpecially 
if  all  this  be  done  while  the  qucllion  is  ftill  open,  and  before   the 
Legiflature,  who  are  alone  authorized  to  decide  it,  are  convened — 
it  is  the  moH/oUmn  duty  which  a  citizen  is  ever  called  upon  to  cxer- 
cife,  to  correft  fuch  falfe  ftatements,  to  remove  erroneous  impref- 
fions,  and  to  endeavour  to  conduft  his  fellow-citizens  from  the  mazy 
labyrinth  of    —or  and  prejudice,  into  the  paths  of  light  and  truth. 
Such   an  c  "  ;iave,  with  confcious  inability,  attempted  to  exe- 

cute ; — Happy,   if  my  feeble  efTorts  fhall  in  any  degree  contribute 
to  prefervc  my  beloved  country  from  the  dangers  which  fiirround  it. 


.-a. 


